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ABSTRACT
When it comes to statutory interpretation, the traditional ap-
proaches fail to consider how the laws being interpreted by the courts
were actually made. Instead, they tend to presume a uniform lawmak-
ing process. In reality, the lawmaking process tends to be highly varia-
ble, both among, and even within, different areas of law. Traditional
interpretive approaches also fail to consider the actual institutional ca-
pabilities of Congress or the courts. Textualist approaches give primacy
to the words that Congress chose. By doing so, they implicitly assume
that legislators accurately constructed the statutory text but pay no at-
tention to whether the actual lawmaking process was reliable or trust-
worthy. By contrast, purposivist approaches idealize the role of judges
by assuming they have the capacity to uncover the purposes that moti-
vated lawmakers to enact what they did. But whether judges indeed
have the capacity to discern Congress’s intent might be influenced by
whether the interpreters are subject-matter specialists or generalists. In
short, the traditional approaches are unsuccessful to the extent they
fail to account for the quality of statutory texts or the quality of courts
interpreting those texts.
One-size-fits-all approaches might cause judges to fall short in ful-
filling their role to accurately interpret statutory text as faithful agents
of Congress. The faithful-agent model assumes that the role of courts,
as agents of Congress, is to interpret statutory text to reflect congres-
sional intent. This model gives lawmaking deference to Congress con-
sistent with the Constitution’s separation of powers. Failing to place
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what Congress said into the context of what it actually did could hin-
der judges from accurately interpreting laws consistent with Congress’s
intent. Likewise, ignoring the expertise of courts considering the mean-
ing of statutory texts might result in imprecise or incomplete
interpretations.
Although scholars have recognized that ready-made interpretative
approaches, like ready-made clothing, might be a poor fit, this Article
is the first to apply these insights to tax law by exploring the suitability
of a custom-tailored interpretive doctrine specifically for the Internal
Revenue Code, arguably the mother of all statutory regimes. In so do-
ing, this Article finds that tax seems to be especially well-suited to a
bespoke statutory interpretive approach, with experts involved in con-
ceptualizing and writing tax laws as well as a specialized Tax Court
with national jurisdiction interpreting the laws. This Article contends
that when courts interpret federal tax laws, they should explicitly and
consistently take account of these unique characteristics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently signaled that tools of statutory inter-
pretation should reflect how Congress actually writes laws. The case
in question, King v. Burwell, involved a challenge to the premium tax
credit provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 The tax credit
helps qualifying taxpayers with the costs of health insurance premi-
ums.2 The statutory language that explains the amount of the credit
refers to enrollment in an insurance plan “through an Exchange estab-
lished by the State.”3 The term “Exchange” refers to the marketplaces
where people can purchase health insurance.4 Generally speaking,
states can operate their own marketplaces or they instead can use the
marketplace administered by the federal government.5
The taxpayers who brought the case were in the unusual posture of
arguing against their entitlement to tax credits.6 If they qualified for
the tax credit, they would be required to purchase health insurance or
become subject to a penalty payable to the Internal Revenue Service.7
Without the tax credit, they would be exempt from the requirement to
purchase health insurance because the cost would be more than 8% of
their income.8 In making their argument, the taxpayers urged the
Court to apply the canon against surplusage, which gives effect to all
the words of a statutory provision.9 Otherwise, they argued, the lan-
guage Congress chose would be meaningless.10 Their contention was
that the phrase “Exchange established by the State” resolved the case
in their favor because they lived in states with federal exchanges.11
Despite the taxpayers’ efforts, which were supported by the seem-
ingly clear language of the statute, the Court found that the tax credit
1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
2. IRS, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: WHAT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY NEED TO KNOW 11
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5187.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/MB2Q-
XQN7].
3. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting I.R.C.
§ 36B(b)(2)(A)).
4. Id. at 2483.
5. Louise Norris, What Type of Health Insurance Exchange Does My State Have?,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.healthinsurance.org/faqs/
what-type-of-health-insurance-exchange-does-my-state-have/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/446A-JBR9].
6. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88. The Treasury Department by regulation took the
seemingly perverse position that taxpayers in states with federal exchanges were
entitled to the tax credit. Id.
7. Id. at 2487 (quoting I.R.C. § 5000A) (imposing a monetary penalty for failure to
maintain minimum insurance coverage).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2492.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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was not limited to taxpayers in states with state exchanges.12 The
Court expressly refused to apply the canon against surplusage be-
cause Congress wrote the ACA “behind closed doors” using unconven-
tional processes that curtailed “care and deliberation.”13 As discussed
later in this Article, these processes, while politically expedient, may
have discouraged meaningful legislative deliberation and trans-
parency.14 Congress’s lack of care and diligence in drafting the statute
caused the Court to question the quality of the legal text and ulti-
mately to ignore the words as written.15
Taking account of the process by which laws are actually enacted,
as the Court did in King v. Burwell, is at odds with the predominant
statutory interpretive approaches. Traditionally there were two rival
approaches: textualism and purposivism.16 As these terms suggest,
and at the risk of oversimplifying, textualists unravel what the draft-
ers said by giving primacy to the words of the statute. By contrast,
purposivists interpret laws to further purposes that reasonably might
have motivated the legislation.17 More recently, textualism and
purposivism have blended into a third school of statutory interpreta-
tion referred to as “new textualism” or “structural textualism,” which
is a sort of constrained purposivism.18
The traditional interpretive approaches are built on idealized as-
sumptions.19 Textualist approaches, by emphasizing the words that
Congress chose, in general idealize the capacities of legislators in
12. Id. at 2495 (noting its departure “from what would otherwise be the most natural
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase”).
13. Id. at 2492. The canon against surplusage assumes that legislators take due care
in drafting statutes, and therefore, every word is to be given effect. ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
174 (2012).
14. See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the pro-
cedural tactics that Congress employed. Procedural shortcomings were also
widely reported in the press. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, History Lesson: How the
Democrats Pushed Obamacare Through the Senate, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/06/22/history-les-
son-how-the-democrats-pushed-obamacare-through-the-senate/
?utm_term=.cc33100f259d [https://perma.unl.edu/7UK3-XWSJ]; Norm Ornstein,
The Real Story of Obamacare’s Birth, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2015), https://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/the-real-story-of-obamacares-birth/
397742/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5X9U-M7UE].
15. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (“The Affordable Care Act contains more than a
few examples of inartful drafting.”); see also Robert Pear, Four Words That Im-
peril Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested-words-in-afford-
able-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html (discussing statements from
several lawmakers that described the ambiguity as a mistake).
16. See infra notes 26–38 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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crafting the legal text. By contrast, purposivist approaches idealize
the capacities of judges by assuming they have the capability to dis-
cover the purposes that motivated lawmakers to enact what they did.
But the traditional approaches fail to consider the actual institutional
capabilities of Congress or the courts. For example, none of the tradi-
tional approaches consider the legislator’s actual level of drafting ex-
pertise or the legislative body’s quality of deliberation so long as a law
was duly enacted.20 Thus, unlike regulations from administrative
agencies, which may receive judicial deference only if the agency fol-
lows the prescribed notice and comment procedures in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, Congress does not have to justify its statutory
lawmaking process.21 The predominant approaches also tend to pre-
sume a uniform lawmaking process. But, in reality, there is great vari-
ability in the lawmaking process for which the predominant
approaches to statutory interpretation fail to account. For example,
much of the development of legislative proposals and the drafting
work occurs in subject-specific congressional committees, which sub-
scribe to their own sets of policies and procedures.22 Yet current inter-
pretive approaches all but ignore this variability.
Scholars have recognized that ready-made interpretative ap-
proaches, like ready-made clothing, might be a poor fit.23 This Article
is the first to apply these insights to tax law by exploring the suitabil-
ity of a custom-tailored interpretive doctrine specifically for the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, which is arguably the mother of all statutory
regimes.24 It is the contention of this Article that several unique char-
acteristics of the tax legislative process should explicitly and consist-
ently be taken account of by courts when they interpret federal tax
law. A customized approach would account for the actual drafting pro-
cess and the relative capabilities of Congress and the courts rather
than relying on an idealized environment disconnected from reality.
To the extent the role of courts when interpreting statutes is to serve
as Congress’s faithful agent, their approach to statutory interpreta-
tion should take into account the process by which the legislation be-
20. See infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. There are twenty standing committees in the House, sixteen in the Senate, and
six joint committees, including the Joint Committee on Taxation. Committees of
the U.S. Congress, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/committees [https://
perma.unl.edu/9D2B-3RNK]; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 920, 1015
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (finding great variability in the
lawmaking process based on surveys and interviews of staff from twenty-six dif-
ferent congressional committees).
23. See infra section II.B.
24. See infra note 86.
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ing interpreted was enacted.25 As King v. Burwell illustrates, putting
what Congress said into context by considering the actual lawmaking
process would allow judges to better discern what Congress meant.
This in turn would help judges more accurately interpret tax laws con-
sistent with Congress’s intent.
Tax seems to be especially well-suited to a bespoke statutory inter-
pretive approach for several reasons. First, courts have at their dispo-
sal very mature tax doctrine and specialized interpretive tools,
including tax-specific substantive canons and common law anti-abuse
doctrines. Second, tax laws are developed using a specialized legisla-
tive process that involves non-partisan experts and produces high-
quality legislative materials. Finally, the interpretation of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code benefits from the institutional capabilities of the
Tax Court, a specialized court of national jurisdiction, which hears the
vast majority of tax claims and exercises informal influence on hierar-
chically superior courts.
To develop my argument, Part II discusses the current environ-
ment and is presented in two sections. Section II.A sketches the tradi-
tional approaches to statutory interpretation, focusing attention on
the ways in which they attempt to uncover congressional intent using
unrealistic assumptions about the lawmaking process. Section II.B
then surveys what various other scholars, writing in non-tax areas of
law, have offered on this subject. Applying that literature, Part III
makes the case for a bespoke interpretive approach for the Internal
Revenue Code. Part IV concludes.
25. Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1568 (2010) (noting that textualism, intentional-
ism, and purposivism are all informed by the faithful-agent model). The faithful-
agent model assumes that the role of courts, as agents of Congress, is to interpret
legal text to reflect congressional intent. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and
the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1502–04 (2006).
This model gives lawmaking deference to Congress consistent with the Constitu-
tion’s separation of powers. Article I of the Constitution vests lawmaking power
in Congress by stating that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I. Section 8 of Article
I gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution [its] Powers.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Courts
are conferred their judicial power pursuant to Article III, which provides: “The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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II. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
A. Traditional Off-the-Rack Interpretive Theories
The purposivist interpretational approach emphasizes an idealized
process by which legislation is deemed to be enacted.26 Purposivism is
rooted in Professors Hart and Sacks’ legal process model, which opti-
mistically assumes that legislators are “reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably,” and that judges are competent to de-
termine what Congress is driving at.27 The legal process perspective
dawned at a time when commentators envisioned a competent legisla-
ture that enacted laws pursuant to a “science of legislation” character-
ized by “long and patient study by experts, careful consideration by
conferences or congresses or associations, press discussions in which
public opinion is focussed [sic] upon all important details, and hear-
ings before legislative committees.”28 The legal process model was in-
tended to restrain judges from substituting their own justifications by
deferring to the lawmakers who were assumed to be “more competent
decision-makers.”29 This approach furthers legislative supremacy by
instructing courts to interpret laws to further purposes that motivated
Congress to legislate. Although the legal process model is one of judi-
cial deference to lawmakers, it optimistically assumed a legislative
process in which lawmakers were competent.30
Recognition of a reality far different from the idealized process
built into the legal process model caused it, along with purposivism, to
fall out of favor. Cynicism replaced optimism as legislation began to be
seen as products of political deals devoid of public purposes that
26. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretative Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1909, 1937–38 (2005).
27. HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169, 1378 (1994). It also assumes that
legislators “try[ ] responsibly and in good faith to discharge their constitutional
powers and duties.” Id.
28. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 119 (1999) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Com-
mon Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908)).
29. Id. at 148. The Legal Process materials can be read to support both a restrained
version of purposivism that limits judicial discretion as well as a more unbounded
version. For example, Hart and Sacks believe the function of the courts is to “de-
cide what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute in the re-
spects relevant to the case before it.” HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 1374.
According to Hart and Sacks, the way to interpret a statute is to “[d]ecide what
purpose ought to be attributed to the statute . . . and then . . . [i]nterpret the
words of the statute immediately in question, so as to carry out the purpose as
best it can.” Id. These materials perhaps imply broad judicial discretion that may
propose to override text. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 113, 148–65 (2011).
30. POPKIN, supra note 28, at 148; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 435 (1989) (“[T]he legal process ref-
erence to ‘reasonableness’ . . . points to the context of the statute’s application
rather than to its background and development.”).
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judges could confidently uncover.31 Without a clear purpose underly-
ing legislation for courts to interpret, the pendulum swung towards
textualism.32 In the absence of legislative purpose, textualists prefer
to stick closely to the text to reduce the chance of judicial misstep or
overreach.33
If purposivism is likened to a focus on process, the textualist inter-
pretational approach emphasizes the product—the statutory text that
Congress enacted. The goal for textualists is to unravel what the
drafters said, not what they meant, by giving primacy to the words of
the statute.34 Textualists “look at texts and not behind or through
them.”35 While textualists do not necessarily favor a hyper-literal
reading of statutory provisions, considerations of statutory purpose
are to be derived “from the text, not from extrinsic sources.”36 Textual-
ists say the use of legislative history to discern lawmakers’ subjective
intent is risky and unreliable. Instead, textualists believe that judges
should interpret the words that Congress enacted because the text it-
self best captures the lawmakers’ objective intent.37 Textualists shun
the use of legislative history to discern purpose because, at best, it
reflects the views of congressional committees, a select sub-group of
Congress, or congressional staff.38
31. POPKIN, supra note 28, at 152.
32. Id. at 169.
33. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Con-
gress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 62
(2015).
34. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 394.
35. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 354 (1995) (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 46 (1987)).
36. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 39, 56. The Supreme Court, which is com-
monly characterized as a textualist court, relied on legislative findings enacted by
Congress to find a statute providing a tax credit ambiguous in King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015). The legislative findings explained Congress’s
intent in the Affordable Care Act to achieve universal health-care coverage. Id. at
2486–87 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 18091). One pillar of the ACA was affordability
of health care through the use of tax credits and a penalty to ensure compliance
with the individual mandate. Id. These features would help to ensure a broad
risk pool of insured individuals. Id. The Court found that the taxpayers’ interpre-
tation that the tax credit did not apply to states without state insurance ex-
changes was inconsistent with Congress’s intent. Id. at 2493–94. That
interpretation “could well push a State’s individual insurance market into a
death spiral” because the absence of premium tax credits would make health in-
surance less affordable in those states. Id.
37. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (assuming
that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language “accurately expresses the
legislative purpose”); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (“The
language of the statute . . . [is] the most reliable evidence of [Congress’s] intent
. . . .”).
38. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that attributing the words in a committee report to the en-
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More recently, textualism and purposivism have blended into a
third school of statutory interpretation referred to as “new textualism”
or “structural textualism,” which is a sort of constrained purposiv-
ism.39 This approach places greater emphasis on structural and con-
textual associations and infers legislative purpose from the statute’s
text and structure.40 Further iterations include more fluid theories
that envision judges taking a more pragmatic approach or employing
a variety of methodologies.41
This discussion is not intended to provide a full elaboration of the
interpretive theories. Rather, the more modest goal is to sketch the
primary approaches and to highlight that the principal disagreement
among them relates to how to reliably determine congressional intent
or purpose. Traditional textualists eschew discerning congressional
intent or purpose, believing it impossible to do so. New textualists,
like their more traditional colleagues, avoid legislative history to dis-
cern congressional intent or purpose. But unlike traditional textual-
ists, new textualists do consider purpose in a limited manner,
confining themselves to stated purposes in the text of the statute, the
text itself, and the structure of the statute. By contrast, certain
purposivists try to glean the actual or presumed original purpose of a
statute by examining the legislative history while other, more liberal
purposivists seek to attribute one or more purposes to a statute be-
yond even the original purpose or presumed intent.42
tire House or Senate is seen as a “kind of ventriloquism”); Jonathan R. Siegel,
The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 131–32
(2009).
39. See Christopher J. Walker, What King v. Burwell Means for Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 36 YALE J. ON REG: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 25, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/what-king-v-burwell-means-for-administrative-law-by-chris-walker/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/PN3Q-PFXX]; see also Taylor, supra note 35 at 379–81 (citing sev-
eral examples of cases employing structural textualism); William N. Eskridge Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 660–66 (1990).
40. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 624 (emphasizing New Textualism’s reliance on
“the structure of the statute, interpretations given similar statutory provisions,
and canons of statutory construction”).
41. See, e.g., Phillip G. Cohen, Statutory Interpretation Lessons Courtesy of Pilgrim’s
Pride, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2017); Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467 (2014); Daniel M.
Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in
Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 340 (2001) (explaining that courts do not
use one exclusive method of interpretation); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321
(1990) (advocating a practical reasoning model of statutory interpretation that
“considers a broad range of textual, historical, and evolutive evidence”).
42. William B. Barker, Statutory Interpretation, Comparative Law, and Economic
Theory: Discovering the Grund of Income Taxation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 821,
848 (2003) (citing GERALD C. MCCALLUM JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ES-
SAYS ON LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 6 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds.,
1993)) (“[M]odern theorists distinguish between legislative intent as intended
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Notably, none of these approaches considers the actual process by
which laws were enacted when interpreting their meaning. Courts
evaluating the meaning of statutory texts historically have not taken
into account the processes by which they were enacted.43 Unlike regu-
lations from administrative agencies, which may receive judicial def-
erence only if the agency follows the prescribed notice and comment
procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress does not
have to justify its statutory lawmaking process.44 While the House
and Senate do have procedural rules, they “are not legally enforcea-
ble.”45 Additionally, these interpretive doctrines are not tailored to
particular areas of law.
The traditional interpretive doctrines may have made more sense
as applied to the conventional lawmaking process. Customarily, a bill
would be introduced and the committee with jurisdiction over the rele-
vant subject matter would debate the bill language and mark it up.46
“Under the traditional model, the markup ranks highly as an expres-
sion of what Congress wanted to do and why because it contains one of
the first intensive discussions of the legislation by members.”47 More
recently, however, Congress has not followed this conventional route.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a good example.48 Rather than
working from the bill language that was referred to the committees,
meaning, which asks, ‘How did [the author] intend these words to be understood?’
and legislative intent as purpose, which asks, ‘What did [the author] intend the
enactment of the statute to achieve?’”).
43. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is not
our place to judge the quality of the care and deliberation that went into this or
any other law. A law enacted by voice vote with no deliberation whatever is fully
as binding upon us as one enacted after years of study, months of committee
hearings, and weeks of debate.”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672
(1892) (stating that a duly enrolled bill is presumed to be authentic and cannot be
impeached by extrinsic evidence); see also Abbe R. Gluck et al, Unorthodox Law-
making, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1857 n.365 (2015)
(quoting Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199
(1976)) (explaining that courts have largely refused “to consider whether Con-
gress engages in ‘due process of lawmaking’ . . . in evaluating a statute’s legiti-
macy or even its meaning”). One exception is the Supreme Court’s enforcement of
lawmaking requirements in Article I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. See Patrick M.
Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a
Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 717–20 (2006) (discussing
cases where the Supreme Court enforces constitutional lawmaking
requirements).
44. See Linde, supra note 43, at 202–03.
45. POPKIN, supra note 28, at 193.
46. John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative
Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. LIB. J. 131, 132 (2013).
47. Id. at 138.
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, & Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029. A similar story can be told with respect to the Tax Cut and
Jobs Act of 2017. See infra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
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Democratic committee members, who constituted the majority of the
committee’s membership, met behind closed doors to craft their fa-
vored bill text and then the committee Chairman proposed this lan-
guage as a substitute for the introduced language.49 As the drafters,
the majority members were able to advance their interests by framing
the issues as they wanted them. Minority members were at a disad-
vantage by having to amend the existing framework. While this strat-
egy makes it easier for the majority to get what they want in the bill
voted out of committee, it effectively forecloses meaningful committee
deliberations.50 Another deviation from traditional legislative process
was the absence of a conference committee to achieve agreement be-
tween the House and Senate versions.51 In the case of the ACA, agree-
ment was achieved through closed-door negotiations between
“Democratic congressional leaders and White House officials.”52 Delib-
erations were also stunted by considering the legislation using the
budget reconciliation process, which limits the kinds of amendments
that may be made, prohibits filibustering in the Senate, limits Senate
debate to twenty hours, and permits passage by a simple majority
vote.53
B. Customized Interpretive Approaches: A Review of the
Literature
Scholars have recognized that ready-made interpretative theories,
like ready-made clothing, may be a poor fit. Professors Cass Sunstein
and Adrian Vermeule, in Interpretation and Institutions, recognized
that the appropriate interpretive doctrine for specialized judges may
be different than that for generalist judges.54 Instead of a one-size-
fits-all approach to statutory interpretation, they argue that interpre-
tational approach should depend on both institutional capabilities and
the consequences that an interpretive approach will have on other
people and institutions, what the authors term the “dynamic effects”
of interpretational approaches.55
Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman uncovered sig-
nificant variability in the legislative drafting process in an empirical
49. See Cannan, supra note 46, at 139, 141.
50. Id. at 138–43 (discussing the lack of deliberations in House committees consider-
ing the ACA).
51. Id. at 158–59.
52. Id. at 159.
53. Id. at 160–66.
54. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 885, 888 n.12 (2003); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005) (noting the distinct interpretive voices of courts and
administrative agencies and arguing that the focus on interpretive approach
should be broadened beyond what to consider the interpreter).
55. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 54, at 886.
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study of how Congress enacts legislation.56 Their survey of 137 con-
gressional staffers revealed unevenness in, among other things, who
drafts legal texts as well as the processes by which legal texts become
law.57 They found that “different [congressional] committees deploy
different drafting practices,” and are staffed with varying levels of so-
phistication and expertise.58 They also discovered that rather than a
standardized, textbook legislative process that the traditional inter-
pretive approaches assume, unorthodox legislative procedures are in-
creasingly being used.59 They recommend that interpretative
principles should evolve to account for the variety of legislative draft-
ing processes.60 Gluck and Bressman’s findings confirm similar find-
ings from an earlier, more limited study conducted by Professors
Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter.61 Nourse and Schacter inter-
viewed and surveyed the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
found significant variability in the drafting process.62 They also found
that “staffers did not view canons as a central factor in drafting
legislation.”63
Professors Shu-Yi Oei and Leigh Osofsky interviewed thirty-one
“current and former government counsels who participated in the tax
legislation drafting process over the past four decades.”64 They sought
to understand how these participants made drafting choices (such as
whether to use an existing defined term or create a new one or
whether to craft a broad general rule with exceptions or a more nar-
rowly-tailored rule) when formulating tax laws.65 They found that
drafters actually gave little thought to these issues. Instead, drafters
writing tax laws sought to maintain existing language and patterns in
the Code, with the result that new provisions are layered onto existing
language.66 The tax counsels interviewed generally seemed uncon-
cerned that the development of the tax law in this “layer-cake fashion”
56. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Ca-
nons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 735–58 (2014).
57. Id. at 735–58.
58. Id. at 750.
59. Id. at 761–62.
60. Id. at 797–800.
61. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
62. Id. at 583–94; see also id. at 617 (“[I]f the wide variability in drafting that we
observed is true of other committees—and the general nature of the factors cited
by our staffers makes this likely—it suggests caution in building a theory of in-
terpretation upon any simple picture of the legislative process.”).
63. Id. at 600.
64. Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Constituencies and Control in Statutory Drafting:
Interviews with Government Tax Counsels (Aug. 15, 2018) 24–25, 104 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019).
65. Id. at 24–28.
66. Id. at 28, 33–34.
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makes for a complex and convoluted Code because ordinary taxpayers
are not their intended audience.67 Instead, they are drafting for tax
experts who presumably are less daunted by the Code’s seemingly
“impenetrable nature.”68 Seen from the perspective of sophisticated
tax professionals, maintaining existing language and patterns helps
to promote stability in the tax law and protect settled expectations,
which might outweigh additional complexity in the law.69 Also, that
the drafters interviewed focused on substantive content rather than
wordsmithing to improve clarity or style makes some superficial sense
given this intended audience.70 The underlying assumption is that tax
experts have the capacity to cut through clunky, convoluted provisions
to meaningfully translate the substantive content for their clients.71
Oei and Osofsky’s work has several implications for this Article.
First, it confirms the disconnect that exists between statutory inter-
pretive theories and the actual drafting process.72 It also calls into
question idealized assumptions underlying certain canons of construc-
tion that do not match reality.73 Finally, the authors aptly note the
challenges that generalist courts face when interpreting a Code made
increasingly convoluted by the layer-cake approach to revising it.74
Jarrod Shobe advances a theory to explain courts’ trend towards
textualism by drawing on the idea that courts are customizing their
interpretive approach in response to what Congress is actually do-
ing.75 In particular, he claims that increases to the staffs of the Office
of Legislative Counsel (OLC) and the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) as well as higher pay for committee staff have led to Congress
getting better at saying what it means in statutory text, which leaves
courts less room for interpretation.76 In short, his claim is that courts’
recent bent toward textualism is attributable to Congress’s improved
institutional capability. Despite the limited involvement of the CRS in
67. Id. at 57.
68. Id. at 31, 54–55, 57.
69. Id. at 33–34.
70. Id. at 50–51.
71. The authors note that “[i]nterviewees seemed to imagine a frictionless transmis-
sion of statutory content to tax experts of boundless capacity, who would in turn
transmit such content to the law’s ultimate subjects.” Id. at 55.
72. Id. at 50–51.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 54–56.
75. Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legis-
lative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014).
76. Id. at 816–17, 834, 853. Professor Thomas Grey also acknowledges that more pre-
cise drafting may restrain judges, leaving them little room to elaborate. See
Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 473, 485 (2003) (noting that the English courts use a strict textualist ap-
proach that is “reinforced by the exact and detailed style of legislative drafting
characteristic of the British Parliament”).
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tax legislation, his work nonetheless illustrates how institutional com-
petence can inform interpretive doctrine.77
Professor Michael Livingston, in a 1991 article, recognized that
theories of statutory interpretation “should be more sensitive to the
differences between . . . the procedures by which [statutes] are en-
acted.”78 He proposed that courts rely on legislative history to inter-
pret tax statutes, noting the involvement of experts from the Treasury
Department and the nonpartisan staff of the Joint Committee on Tax-
ation (JCT).79 These experts’ involvement in a “highly specialized”
and “routinized” tax legislative process make courts’ reliance on tax
legislative history less objectionable than other areas of the law.80
Professor Livingston distinguished between legislative history that
explains the provision at issue and legislative history that provides
detailed guidance.81 While tax experts are involved in writing both
types of legislative history, he recommended less deference for the lat-
ter, fearing detailed guidance in the form of “pseudo-regulations” is
better left to the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Depart-
ment rather than Congress.82
Like Professor Livingston, Professor Clinton Wallace recognizes
the unique role of the JCT in the tax legislative process.83 He proposes
a new interpretive canon that he terms the “JCT Canon.”84 Courts
applying the JCT Canon would interpret ambiguous tax statutes “in
77. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 64, at 36 (“The two Legislative Counsel offices hold
primary drafting responsibility for the tax law, as they do with other areas of the
law.”); Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L.
REV. 179, 202 (2017). For a discussion of the role of the OLC in drafting tax legis-
lation, see infra note 177.
78. See Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative His-
tory and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 823 (1991) [here-
inafter Interpretation of Tax Statutes]. In 1994, Professor Livingston analyzed
courts’ use of post-enactment tax legislative history. Michael A. Livingston,
What’s Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General
Explanations and the Role of “Subsequent” Tax Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 91 (1994).
79. Interpretation of Tax Statutes, supra note 78, at 832–39, 842.
80. Id. at 826, 837.
81. Id. at 819.
82. Id. at 874–82; cf. Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W. Hickman & Donald C.
Lubick, Reexamining the Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing
Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804 (1989). Ferguson et al. assert that “explicit
and specific” tax legislative history in the form of committee reports “should be
considered as having virtual parity with the statute itself” due to the unique
characteristics of the Internal Revenue Code and the tax legislative process. Id.
at 823.
83. Wallace, supra note 77, at 196–203.
84. Id. at 225.
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the same manner as the JCT did in producing revenue estimates and
other analysis and explanations for the statute.”85
III. URGING A TAX-SPECIFIC INTERPRETIVE DOCTRINE
This Part explores the suitability of a specific interpretive doctrine
for the Internal Revenue Code, arguably the mother of all statutory
regimes.86 Tax seems to be especially well-suited to a bespoke statu-
tory interpretive approach for several reasons. First, courts have at
their disposal very mature tax doctrine and specialized interpretive
tools, including tax-specific substantive canons and common law anti-
abuse doctrines. Second, tax laws are developed using a specialized
legislative process, which involves non-partisan experts and produces
high-quality legislative materials. Finally, the interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code benefits from the institutional capabilities of
the Tax Court and downward deference given to it by hierarchically
superior courts. Each of these features is discussed in detail below.
A. Tax Is a Mature Area of Law
While the modern-day federal income tax commonly is traced back
to passage of the Constitution’s Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, its
roots reach back even further.87 Congress created the position of Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue in 1862 shortly after the first income
tax was enacted in 1861 to help fund the Civil War.88 The forerunner
of the United States Tax Court, the Board of Tax Appeals, was
launched in 1924 and is one of the oldest specialized courts estab-
lished by Congress.89 The first committee that Congress created was
85. Id. 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) assigns to the JCT the job of estimating revenues to aid
Congress in tax lawmaking. Abbe Gluck has proposed a CBO Canon pursuant to
which “ambiguous statutes should be interpreted in accordance with the reading
of the statute adopted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in calculating
its budgetary impact.” Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the
Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve
on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 (2017).
86. In his 2013 article, journalist George Will described the Internal Revenue Code
as having four million words and requiring taxpayers to spend 6.1 billion hours
annually to comply with it. George F. Will, Taming the Tax Code Beast, WASH.
POST (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-tam-
ing-the-tax-code-beast/2013/08/09/230783ce-011b-11e3-9a3e-916de805f65d_story
.html?utm_term=.4f4e4261341e [https://perma.unl.edu/AN7M-MVNS]. In addi-
tion to the often-touted complexity of the Code, it has a very long shelf life. See
infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
87. See Diane L. Fahey, The Movement to Destroy the Income Tax and the IRS: Who
Is Doing It and How They Are Succeeding, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 173–82 (2014).
88. Brief History of the IRS, IRS.GOV (July 25, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/
brief-history-of-irs [https://perma.unl.edu/58W9-EE3J].
89. Karla W. Simon, Constitutional Implications of the Tax Legislative Process, 10
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 235, 237–38 (1992). Congress initially established the Board of
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the Joint Committee on Taxation, which was created in 1926.90 This
more than 100-year lifespan of the federal income tax has resulted in
a rich body of law and several interpretive tools, including tax-specific
substantive canons, common law anti-abuse doctrines, the Whole-
Code structural canon, and “tax logic.”91
1. Tax-Specific Substantive Canons
Canons are nothing more than constructs developed by courts to
interpret legal text.92 They are merely guidelines, not rules of law that
must be followed in every case.93 As a result, judges have been ac-
cused of relying on interpretive canons after-the-fact “as the prover-
bial intoxicated man relies on a lamppost upon stumbling out of a
pub—for support, not illumination.”94
Canons may be broadly categorized as either structural or substan-
tive.95 Structural canons rely on a text’s semantics, syntax, and con-
text.96 Substantive canons, by contrast, are used to interpret legal
text in ways that are presumed to advance substantive public values
Tax Appeals as an independent agency within the executive branch. HAROLD
DUBROFF & BRANT J. HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 117 (2d ed. 2014). In 1969, Congress established it as a legislative court
pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution and renamed it the United States
Tax Court. Id. at 175; I.R.C. § 7441.
90. Simon, supra note 89, at 237.
91. Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 651–52 (1986) (discussing “tax logic” of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Tufts, which held that the full
amount of a non-recourse mortgage should be included in the debtor’s amount
realized when the property is disposed of even if the debt exceeds the property’s
fair market value).
92. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 117 (2010). Canons themselves are assumptions that may not represent the
actual process by which legislation is enacted. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra
note 22, at 949–60.
93. Thomas A. Bishop, The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in Connecti-
cut: A Case Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 825, 848–49 (2009) (explaining that “[i]n
most cases of statutory interpretation, . . . the analytical route taken by the court
is at most dicta and not part of its holding,” and therefore not subject to stare
decisis).
94. See Peter A. Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez Jr., Interpreting Tax Statutes: When Are
Statutory Presumptions Justified?, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 389, 390 (2004).
95. Commentators may assign different labels for conceptually similar categories.
See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 92, at 117 (using the terms “linguistic” and “sub-
stantive”); see id. at 117 n.27 for additional examples. Courts more frequently
rely on structural canons as they become increasingly textualist because many
canons rely on textual semantics and syntax. Gluck, supra note 33, at 73 (“Every
major recent statutory opinion, from every Justice on the Court, has relied heav-
ily on interpretive canons to decide cases; their rise derives from textualism’s
impact on the tools—text and presumptions, not legislative history and pur-
pose—that virtually all judges now use to interpret statutes.”).
96. These categories are from SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at xii–xiii.
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or policies consistent with Congress’s intent.97 Importantly, canons,
whether structural or substantive, are judicial constructs that are ex-
ternal to the statute.98
The same kinds of statutory interpretative canons used in nontax
cases apply to tax cases.99 Additionally, courts have developed canons
that apply specifically to tax statutes. The creation of doctrine-specific
canons is not unique to tax. For example, the rule of lenity is a com-
mon law doctrine that results in a lenient interpretation of ambiguous
criminal statutes.100 Under the rule of lenity, a criminal defendant
should be convicted only if the statute clearly bars the defendant’s con-
duct.101 Thus, conviction is not warranted even if the statute reasona-
bly can be read to include the defendant’s conduct.102 By reading the
statute narrowly, judges applying the rule of lenity are exercising re-
straint in favor of criminal defendants.
A rule of lenity exists in civil immigration law and also in civil
bankruptcy law, meaning that ambiguous immigration and bank-
ruptcy statutes are construed in favor of non-citizens and debtors, re-
spectively.103 Unlike the rule of lenity in criminal law, which is rooted
in the Constitution’s due process protections and separation of powers,
the source of lenity rules that apply in bankruptcy and immigration
are likely rooted in presumed congressional intent.104 For example,
construing bankruptcy provisions in favor of a debtor furthers the goal
of giving debtors a “fresh start.”105
Taxpayers would prefer a narrow, restrictive reading of Code pro-
visions that impose tax—a rule of tax lenity of sorts—and a broad,
expansive reading of Code provisions that permit deductions, exclu-
sions, or credits. Courts have developed tax-specific canons that work
against taxpayers on both counts by interpreting Code provisions that
97. Barrett, supra note 92, at 117.
98. See id.
99. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
& GIFTS 4.2.1 (3d ed. 1999) (“In deciding federal tax cases, the courts also employ
the same generalized maxims of statutory construction—usually crouched in
Latin—that are regularly encountered in other areas of the law . . . .”).
100. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1207 (2014); Note,
Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 2043, 2044 (2010).
101. Note, supra note 100.
102. See id.
103. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 100, at 1212, 1214.
104. Note, supra note 100, at 2055 (describing justifications for criminal rule of lenity).
105. ESKRIDGE ET AL, supra note 100, at 1212.
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impose tax broadly and interpreting provisions authorizing deduc-
tions, exclusions, and credits narrowly.106
a. Income
In the early years of the income tax, courts recognized a rule of tax
lenity pursuant to which ambiguous taxing statutes were “construed
most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.”107
The justification for such a presumption may have been based on the
notion that a narrow reading of taxing statutes best protected the con-
stitutional power that only Congress has to impose taxes. Read in that
manner, the canon constrained courts that might otherwise have
sought to tailor tax legislation in ways inconsistent with Congress’s
will.108 Judicial expansion of legislation that taxed income was partic-
ularly problematic because it increased government power:
The classic nineteenth century view of taxation was that public taxation law
deprived the individual of property due to the subjugation of the individual’s
will to that of the sovereign. Taxation was a necessary evil; thus, the obliga-
tion to pay tax had to be mandated in clear and unequivocal language. . . . The
prevailing attitude in the nineteenth century was that the property depriva-
tion imposed by income tax law was analogous to the deprivation of life or
liberty imposed by criminal law.109
While modern courts occasionally rely on this pro-taxpayer pre-
sumption,110 it has fallen out of favor.111 The modern interpretation
106. See infra notes 134–145 and accompanying text. Of course, not all Code provi-
sions are neatly categorized as income, deduction, exemption, or credit
provisions.
107. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). The Court in Gould v. Gould held that
alimony payments did not constitute income. Congress overruled the Court’s de-
cision in 1942 by enacting section 71 of the Code. See United States v. Merriam,
263 U.S. 179, 187–88 (1923) (“[I]n statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of
the words employed is most important for such statutes are not to be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubt-
ful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer.”).
108. See United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 597 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1842)
(“In every case . . . of doubt, [taxing] statutes are construed most strongly against
the government, and in favor of the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not
to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly
and clearly import. Revenue statutes are in no just sense either remedial laws or
laws founded upon any permanent public policy, and, therefore, are not to be
liberally construed.”); see also NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHER-
LAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.1 (7th ed. 2017) and cases
cited therein (“Courts have suggested that, since there can be no taxation except
as provided for by legislative enactment, strict construction is a way to assure
that no taxes be exacted except by legislative authority.”).
109. Barker, supra note 42, at 827. Refer to Barker’s article for a nice summary of the
Court’s evolving jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of the term “income.”
110. See, e.g., Security Bank Minnesota v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 432, 441 (8th Cir. 1993).
Justice Thomas gave a nod to the canon in 2001 in United Dominion Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n
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views the concept of income expansively.112 This turnabout occurred
despite the fact that the statutory text defining income has remained
virtually unchanged since 1913. Then and now, Congress has defined
the term income broadly to include income from any source.113
As Professor Popkin has noted: “[T]he increasing importance of
revenue in the modern state undermines the canon that favored a nar-
row interpretation of statutes imposing taxes.”114 Although Popkin
was not referring to any particular event, it seems that several events
might have been responsible for the demise of the rule of tax lenity,
including the Great Depression and the First and Second World
Wars.115 By the end of World War II, the Supreme Court noted that
the term income “is described in sweeping terms and should be
cases . . . in which the complex statutory and regulatory scheme lends itself to
any number of interpretations, we should be inclined to rely on the traditional
canon that construes revenue-raising laws against their drafter.”).
111. JASPER L. CUMMINGS JR., THE SUPREME COURT’S FEDERAL TAX JURISPRUDENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF FACT FINDING METHODS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FROM
THE COURT’S TAX OPINIONS, 1801–PRESENT 188 (2d ed. 2016) (providing that “the
rule of strict construction against the government has waned . . . .” and noting a
“broader overall regime of mostly anti-taxpayer tilts in the tax law”); see also id.
at 71 (explaining that federal courts tend to “construe income broadly and deduc-
tions narrowly”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 299–300 (noting that al-
though “[f]or many years, the Supreme Court of the United States” applied a rule
of tax lenity, “it unfortunately can no longer be said to enjoy universal approval”).
The Supreme Court has cited to Gould v. Gould, the genesis of the rule of tax
lenity, only 14 times, the last in 1940. The Tax Court has cited to Gould in 23
decisions, the last in 2013. The 2013 case justified applying a rule of lenity be-
cause a tax penalty provision was involved. Mohamed v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2013-255 (T.C. 2013) (interpreting I.R.C. § 6651(f)).
112. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The Court in Glenshaw
Glass was interpreting section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which
defined gross income to include “gains, profits, and income . . . of whatever kind.”
Id. at 429. In holding that lawsuit settlement proceeds were includable in gross
income, the Court noted that it “has given a liberal construction to this broad
phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted.” Id. at 430.
113. Compare section 22(a) of the Income Tax Act of 1913, Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B),
38 Stat. 114, 167 (“[N]et income . . . shall include . . . income derived from any
source whatever . . . .”) with § 61(a) of Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“[G]ross
income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”). This broad lan-
guage mirrors the text of the Sixteenth Amendment, which gives Congress
“power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI. The Court has noted that the language Congress used in the
Code to define gross income “indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full
measure of its taxing power.” Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
114. POPKIN, supra note 28, at 201.
115. Michael Schuyler, A Short History of Government Taxing and Spending in the
United States, TAX FOUND. 5–6 (Feb. 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/short-his-
tory-government-taxing-and-spending-united-states/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
ND5B-GPRP] (noting increases in tax revenues and government expenditures
during the Great Depression and major wars, including both World Wars).
Schuyler notes that federal spending increased ten-fold during World War I and
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broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax in-
come comprehensively.”116 By the mid-1950s, the law had fully
evolved.117
b. Deductions, Exemptions, and Credits
Courts have consistently interpreted statutes authorizing tax de-
ductions, credits, or exemptions narrowly.118 The common thread run-
ning through all three is that, to the extent applicable, each provides a
benefit in one form or another to the taxpayer. Both deductions and
exemptions lower a taxpayer’s taxable income on which tax liability is
computed whereas credits reduce the amount of tax owed.119
A narrow interpretation of deduction, exemption, and credit provi-
sions helps Congress exercise its broad taxing power. The Supreme
Court in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering justified the presumption
against deductions because Congress has the power to tax gross in-
then again in World War II and that revenues and expenditures “have been per-
manently higher since World War II.” Id. at 6.
116. Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
117. Hunley v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1966-66 (T.C. 1966) (recognizing that Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) “represent[s] the final step in the
evolution of an all-inclusive concept of the term ‘income’ by the Supreme Court”).
A rule of tax lenity of sorts continues to exist with respect to Code provisions that
impose a penalty. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505
(1992) (applying a rule of lenity to interpret a Code provision that imposes a $200
tax on the “maker” of a firearm for each firearm made where failure to comply
could result in imprisonment of not less than 10 years); Comm’r v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87, 91 (1959) (holding that tax penalty provisions “are to be strictly con-
strued” such that a taxpayer cannot be “subjected to a penalty unless the words of
the statute plainly impose it) (citations omitted); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 100, at 1207 (“Rule of lenity may apply to civil sanction that is punitive or
when underlying liability is criminal.”). But as Eskridge notes, “The Court ap-
plies this canon very unevenly.” Id. at 1207 n.141.
118. E.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
59–60 (2011) (providing that “exemptions from taxation are to be construed nar-
rowly”) (quoting Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969)). Justice Scalia and
Bryan Garner call this presumption a “false notion.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 13, at 359–63. They assert that statutes providing tax exemptions are not
subject to special treatment. Instead of a narrow reading, they should be given
their “fair,” or reasonable meaning just like any other statutory provision. Id. at
362. “Fair reading” is the normative approach the authors recommend. Id. at 33;
see generally Lowy & Vasquez Jr., supra note 94 (finding a presumption that tax
statutes permitting deductions are to be interpreted narrowly to be unjustified);
Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142
(1943).
119. See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 2.01, ¶ 20.01[1] (3d ed. 2002) (describing the
calculation of taxable income and describing and distinguishing credits from
deductions).
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come—not just gross income net of deductions.120 Understood in this
manner, deductions exist solely by “legislative grace.”121 Thus, “a tax-
payer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable stat-
ute and show that he comes within its terms.”122 Within a short
period after deciding New Colonial Ice, the Court referred to the pre-
sumption as a “now familiar rule”123 and a “strict rule of construc-
tion.”124 More recently, the Court reiterated this broad presumption:
“[T]his Court has noted the ‘familiar rule’ that ‘an income tax deduc-
tion is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’”125
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, justified the presumption by
invoking a general interpretive canon that exceptions from a general
rule must be narrowly construed.126 In holding that a target corpora-
tion’s takeover expenses were not deductible as “ordinary and neces-
sary” trade or business expenses pursuant to section 162(a) but
instead must be capitalized pursuant to section 263(a)(1), the Court
identified capitalization as the general rule and the provision permit-
ting deductibility to be the exception.127 The Court’s “standard ap-
proach” is to “read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the
primary operation of the provision.”128
As a practical matter, a narrow construction of deductions, credits,
and exemptions inures to the benefit of the federal fisc because deny-
ing deductions or exemptions increases a taxpayer’s taxable income on
which tax liability is computed, and a denial of credits increases the
amount of tax owed.129 It may be that courts simply intend to rein-
force the traditional justification for taxes, which is to raise revenue to
fund public goods and services.130
120. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
124. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S. v. Comm’r, 321 U.S. 560, 564 (1944) (citing
New Colonial Ice Co., 292 U.S. 435).
125. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (quoting Interstate Transit
Lines, 319 U.S. at 593) (citing Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); New Colo-
nial Ice, 292 U.S. 435).
126. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
127. Id.
128. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
129. Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) (explaining that tax exemptions
“should be construed with restraint” to further the “obvious purpose to tax in-
come comprehensively”).
130. See Barker, supra note 42, at 822 (“Income taxation is the primary way demo-
cratic societies allocate the financial burden of government to its people.”); James
W. Colliton, Standards, Rules, and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxa-
tion, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 324 n.302 (1995) (“[E]ven though our basic and secon-
dary values form much of the tax law, the basic purpose of the tax law remains
the collection of revenue.”). Relying on revenue raising as the purpose for tax law
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2. Common Law Anti-Abuse Doctrines
In addition to tax-specific substantive canons, courts have devel-
oped doctrines to fight abusive tax transactions. Most typically, these
anti-abuse doctrines either (1) add non-statutory requirements to a
Code provision or (2) recharacterize or disregard the form of a transac-
tion to match its substance. Examples of the first type include the bus-
iness purpose doctrine and the economic substance doctrine.131
Examples that fall within the second category include the substance-
over-form doctrine and the step-transaction doctrine.132 This Article
need not belabor the subject of common-law anti-abuse doctrines as
much has been written elsewhere.133 What is important to emphasize
is their effect, which is to disregard transactions even though they
comply with the Code by claiming that what the taxpayer did is not
what the statute means irrespective of what the statute seems to
is over simplified. While Congress historically enacted tax legislation to raise rev-
enue, for example, to fund the war effort or to reduce deficits, it has also been
known to use tax reduction to stimulate the economy. ROBERT M. HOWARD, GET-
TING A POOR RETURN: COURTS, JUSTICE, AND TAXES 9–10 (2009). Additionally,
Congress uses the Code to carry out various government programs and to incen-
tivize taxpayer behavior. John M. Samuels, The Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation—From the Outside Looking In 9 (2016), https://uschs.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/USCHS-History-Role-Joint-Committee-Taxation-Samuels.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/5FSM-YC4T] (“For example, today the tax system plays
an integral part in the design and delivery of healthcare, welfare and child care
benefits to the vast majority of Americans; and in how the Nation’s major hous-
ing, retirement, savings, educational, environmental, charitable and energy pro-
grams are designed, funded and implemented.”); see also Robert Thornton Smith,
Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Jurisprudence, 72 TAXES 527, 552
(1994) (explaining that reliance on the purpose of the tax law of raising revenue
is an insufficient backstop without consideration of principles such as fairness
and equality). According to Smith, “revenue raising provisions nonetheless gener-
ally are (should be) designed to do so in ways that are grounded on principled
convictions about fairness and appropriateness to the tax system.” Id. at 555.
131. The economic substance doctrine has since been codified in section 7701(o).
132. Amy Lee Rosen, Tax Court Ruling Could Widen Divide Over Substance Doctrine,
LAW360 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025541/tax-court-rul-
ing-could-widen-divide-over-substance-doctrine (quoting Stuart Bassin as stat-
ing: “The simple version of substance over form is that if it looks like a duck,
quacks like a duck and walks like a duck, it’s a duck, even if you call it a horse”).
133. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Grossberg, Attacking Tax Shelters: Galloping Toward a
Better Step Transaction Doctrine, 78 LA. L. REV. 369 (2018); Joseph Bankman,
The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Noel B. Cunning-
ham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004);
Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-Form
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699 (2003); Daniel M. Schneider,
Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by Trial Courts,
1993–2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35 (2009); Robert
Thornton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1
(1999).
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say.134 As Professor Jay Soled describes it, these judicially created
anti-abuse doctrines “operate as the courts’ fingers to plug holes in the
fiscal dike left unintentionally open by the legislature or by the literal
words of the Code.”135 When courts deploy these interpretive doc-
trines, they impose a gloss over the words of tax statutes presumably
to effectuate Congress’s intent.136
It may seem peculiar that extra-statutory doctrines exist to inter-
pret the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, which is “highly retic-
ulated” and uses “lots of language, with nearly mathematical
precision.”137 But the Joint Committee on Taxation provides a practi-
cal explanation:
A strictly rule-based tax system cannot efficiently prescribe the appropriate
outcome of every conceivable transaction that might be devised and is, as a
result, incapable of preventing all unintended consequences. Thus, many
courts have long recognized the need to supplement tax rules with anti-tax-
avoidance standards . . . in order to assure the Congressional purpose is
achieved.138
Because the anti-abuse doctrines are crafted specifically for use in
tax cases, they could be labeled “tax-specific canons” and discussed
along with the other tax-specific canons described earlier in this Arti-
cle.139 However, a unique category seems appropriate for the anti-
abuse doctrines because, unlike canons, courts deploy them as more
134. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 865 (1982) (“When someone calls a dog a cow and then seeks a subsidy
provided by statute for cows, the obvious response is that this is not what the
statute means. It may also happen that rich people who would not otherwise have
cows buy them to gain cow subsidies. Here, when people say . . . that this is not
what the statute means, they are in fact saying something quite different.”).
135. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Pricing Controver-
sies, 42 B.C. L. REV. 587, 590 (2001). Professor Halperin refers to these gaps as
“unintentional glitches.” Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48
TAX LAW. 807, 807 (1995).
136. See Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Both
sides to this dispute . . . agree that these transactions, as consummated, complied
in full with the Internal Revenue Code. If this case dealt with any other title of
the United States Code, we would stop there.”).
137. Id. at 789; see also United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) (finding
“highly detailed technical manner” of section 6511, which sets forth limitations
period for filing refund claims, precludes equitable tolling); Gregory v. Helvering,
27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932), rev’d, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934) (“A statute so meticu-
lously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy, and
leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration.”).
138. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED
IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 378 (2011) (discussing codification of the economic sub-
stance doctrine).
139. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 21 (3d Cir.
2016) (“[C]ommon law tax doctrines can . . . perhaps best be thought of as a tool of
statutory interpretation.”). See supra subsection III.A.1 for discussion of tax-spe-
cific canons.
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than mere tools of statutory interpretation.140 Consider Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund v. United States.141 The specific issue in
Klamath was whether a loan premium was a liability within the
meaning of section 752(b). Section 752(b) provides that “[a]ny . . . de-
crease in a partner’s individual liabilities by reason of the assumption
by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as
a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.”142 Distri-
butions of money reduce the basis of the partner’s partnership inter-
est.143 Section 752(b) is not a provision that provides a deduction nor
does it alone impose a tax. It simply describes how a partnership’s
assumption of a partner’s liabilities effects the partner’s tax basis in
its partnership interest. Consequently, resort to other tax-specific ca-
nons was of no use. So how should the provision be construed? The
issue was not answered by reference to the statute, which did not de-
fine “liability.”
The taxpayer in Klamath capitalized a new partnership with cash
as well as loan proceeds and assigned the loan obligations to the part-
nership, but—relying on agency guidance—did not treat the loan pre-
mium as a liability.144 The partnership purchased foreign currencies
and then liquidated shortly thereafter.145 The taxpayer took a basis in
the partnership property—namely the foreign currencies—received in
the liquidation equal to its basis in its partnership interest.146 By
maintaining that there was no reduction to outside basis for the loan
premium, the taxpayer claimed a tax loss upon the sale of the foreign
currencies.147 The taxpayer advocated a narrow reading of an ambigu-
ous statutory provision—one that did not define the term “liability” to
include the loan premium. The Fifth Circuit did not decide whether
the term “liability” included the loan premium at issue. It avoided the
statutory interpretation issue entirely. Instead, it altogether disre-
garded the loan transaction, finding it lacked economic substance, and
thus disallowed the loss that the taxpayer claimed.148 Used in this
140. See Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. No. 7, 2018 WL 1168766, at *34 (Mar. 5, 2018)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “abandon[ing] general princi-
ples of statutory construction in favor of judge-made doctrines that undermine or
ignore the text of the Code to recast transactions to avoid ‘abuse’”).
141. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d
537, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2009).
142. I.R.C. § 752(b).
143. I.R.C. § 733(1).
144. Klamath, 568 F.3d at 541. The loan premium was essentially an early prepay-
ment penalty because the bank lent the funds at an above-market interest rate.
Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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manner, the economic substance doctrine was something wholly dif-
ferent than a tool of statutory interpretation.
Unlike canons of statutory interpretation, which are generally ac-
cepted by courts, the judicial anti-abuse doctrines are controversial.
One concern is that application of the doctrines is nothing more than
results-oriented unprincipled decision making and judicial overreach.
As Judge McKee said in his dissent in ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner:
I can’t help but suspect that the majority’s conclusion . . . is, in its essence,
something akin to a “smell test.” If the scheme in question smells bad, the
intent to avoid taxes defines the result as we do not want the taxpayer to “put
one over.” . . . The fact that ACM may have “put one over” in crafting these
transactions ought not to influence our inquiry. Our inquiry is cerebral, not
visceral. To the extent that the Commissioner is offended by these transac-
tions he should address Congress and/or the rulemaking process, and not the
courts.149
In contrast to general interpretive and tax-specific canons, which the
U.S. Supreme Court routinely relies on, some speculate that the anti-
abuse doctrines are unlikely to survive Supreme Court review due to
the textualist approach to interpretation that seems to be in vogue
there currently.150 Given the opportunity, the Court may disregard
these doctrines either because (1) the lower courts have spawned them
by misconstruing and misapplying Supreme Court precedent or (2) as
interpretive tools, they would not be entitled to stare decisis.151
The evolution of the business purpose doctrine demonstrates the
proliferation of these anti-abuse doctrines in the lower courts. The
business purpose doctrine disallows claimed tax benefits from a trans-
action if the transaction is not motivated by a sufficient business pur-
pose other than tax savings.152 The United States Supreme Court’s
Gregory v. Helvering decision in 1935 is credited with establishing the
business purpose doctrine.153 Mrs. Gregory was the sole shareholder
of United Mortgage Corporation (UMC), which owned appreciated
149. ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting).
150. Madison, supra note 133, at 739; see also Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. No. 7, 2018
WL 1168766, at *34 (Mar. 5, 2018) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (ignoring statutory
text to prevent consequences the court believes are unintended is “untenable”
given the “great textualist counterrevolution of the last few decades.”).
151. CUMMINGS, supra note 111, at 212–13. The last time the U.S. Supreme Court
heard a case involving a tax anti-abuse doctrine was in 1978 in Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). It may be that the government is strategic
about which cases to appeal to avoid a negative ruling from the Supreme Court.
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Sec., Report on the Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse
Rule, 64 TAX NOTES 233, 234–35 (1994).
152. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (providing that courts disallow
purported tax benefits deriving from a transaction that has “no business or corpo-
rate purpose” but instead is “a mere device . . . [used] as a disguise for concealing
its real character”).
153. Id. at 465.
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stock in another corporation, Monitor Securities Corporation
(MSC).154 She wished to sell the MSC stock and obtain the proceeds
without receiving a dividend from UMC, which would have been taxed
at higher rates.155 If UMC sold the shares and distributed the pro-
ceeds to her, the corporation would incur tax liability and Mrs. Greg-
ory would have had to recognize ordinary income as a result of the
distribution. She also would have had ordinary income had UMC dis-
tributed the MSC shares to her. To get capital gain treatment, the
parties pre-wired a transaction that in form was a tax-free reorganiza-
tion whereby UMC transferred the MSC shares to a new corporation,
Averill Corporation (Averill), for Averill shares that were distributed
to Mrs. Gregory.156 Three days later, Mrs. Gregory exchanged the
Averill shares she received in the purported reorganization for the
MSC shares by liquidating Averill.157 She recognized capital gain in
the liquidation, but no further gain on the sale of the MSC shares.158
The Court disregarded the purported reorganization, finding the
transaction was a “conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorgani-
zation.”159 The reorganization statute referred to a corporation’s
transfer of assets to another corporation “in pursuance of a plan of
reorganization.”160 Because Averill was formed to temporarily hold
the MSC stock, and then was liquidated, the Court found there was
“no business or corporate purpose” for the transactions other than to
transfer the MSC shares to Mrs. Gregory.161 Although the Court de-
rived a business purpose requirement from the text of the reorganiza-
tion statute at issue, lower courts have relied on Gregory to impose a
business purpose requirement on the Code more generally instead of
limiting the Court’s holding to similar fact situations.162
A similar phenomenon occurred with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ilfeld v. Commissioner, in which a consolidated group deducted
losses incurred on the disposition of subsidiary stock after the losses
had already reduced the parent corporation’s taxable income.163 The
Court disallowed the second loss deduction “[i]n the absence of a provi-
sion . . . that fairly may be read to authorize it.”164 The Ilfeld decision
154. Id. at 467.
155. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
156. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 470.
160. Id. at 469.
161. Id.
162. See CUMMINGS, supra note 111, at 93–94.
163. Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934). This result would no longer
be possible because the investment adjustment rules require a decrease to the
parent’s tax basis in its subsidiary stock for the subsidiary’s taxable loss. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) (2013).
164. Ilfeld, 292 U.S. at 66.
1144 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1118
reasonably can be read to have created a tool to interpret ambiguous
tax provisions.165 But the Tax Court has applied Ilfeld more broadly
to disallow double deductions regardless of the statutory language at
issue.166 The relevant question is whether Ilfeld established a proce-
dural rule, which “merely govern[s] how courts will go about their own
business when deciding disputes” or instead created a substantive
rule of law.167
There is also debate about the origin of the economic substance
doctrine. Jack Cummings notes the economic substance doctrine’s
“questionable pedigree.”168 It is sometimes traced back to the Su-
preme Court’s 1978 decision in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States.169
Despite its shaky lineage, at least one appeals court described the eco-
nomic substance doctrine as a “gloss” overlaying the Code.170
* * *
Tax-specific substantive canons and anti-abuse doctrines usually
work to the government’s favor.171 While taxpayers generally are
stuck with the form of the transaction they chose, the government
may invoke anti-abuse doctrines to stray from the literal language of a
165. See W. Wade Sutton Jr., Duquesne and Ilfeld: A Risen Phoenix or an Entirely
Different Animal?, 41 J. CORP. TAX’N 28, 30 (2014).
166. See Duquesne Light Holdings v. Comm’r, 2013-216 T.C.M. (RIA) 1735, 1749
(2013) (stating that the “court will apply . . . Ilfeld in any Federal income tax case
involving a consolidated return group where the group claims a deduction for a
taxable year for an economic loss that duplicates another deduction already
taken by the group for the same economic loss”); Thrifty Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 139
T.C. 198, 212 (2012) (“If a taxpayer can point to a specific provision demonstrat-
ing congressional intent to allow the double deduction, the second deduction
would be authorized. If the taxpayer cannot show congressional intent, then the
double deduction would not be allowed.”).
167. Sutton, supra note 165, at 28. As a procedural rule, Ilfeld would apply at the
discretion of courts. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1158 (10th
Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing the Chevron doctrine as a proce-
dural rule that receives “little precedential consideration”).
168. CUMMINGS, supra note 111, at 213.
169. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); cf. CUMMINGS, supra note
111, at 207 (stating that the economic substance doctrine has no proper origin in
Supreme Court opinions or in the Code); id. at 212 (“The Supreme Court has
never used the term prior to a passing reference in 2013, has never stated it as a
general ‘doctrine.’”).
170. See United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir.
2001); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 99, at 4.3.1 (describing the anti-
abuse doctrines as “so pervasive that they resemble a preamble to the Code,
describing the framework within which all statutory provisions are to function”).
171. Zelenak, supra note 91, at 667 (noting that nonliteral interpretations tend to
favor the government). But see Schneider, supra note 133, at 66 (challenging the
assumption that judicial anti-abuse doctrines are a one-way street in favor of the
government).
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statute.172 These doctrines, when successfully invoked, reduce reve-
nue leakage. It is thus unsurprising that “in tax litigation, the govern-
ment wins significantly more often than taxpayers.”173
3. Whole-Code Structural Canon
The Whole-Code canon is a general-purpose structural canon that
plays an out-sized role in the interpretation of the Internal Revenue
Code.174 This canon instructs courts to read the words of a statute “in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.”175 The goal is to “interpret the statute as a symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme,” and “fit, if possible, all parts into an har-
monious whole.”176 The Whole-Code canon presumes that the various
titles of the United States Code are internally consistent and are
drafted in a cohesive and consistent manner.177 If this is true, then
the meaning of a word or phrase in one provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code should be interpreted in a manner compatible with the same
word or phrase used elsewhere in the Code.178 One empirical study
found that when the Supreme Court relies on language canons in its
tax decisions, it invokes “the whole act rule or similar presumptions
172. Comm’r v. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549 (1965), vacated, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 858 (1967), remanded to, 50 T.C. 782 (1968) (providing that
taxpayers cannot disavow form of transaction absent fraud, mistake, undue influ-
ence). Without such a rule, taxpayers in effect could elect their tax consequences
after the fact. See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952) (“The
practical reason for such a rule is that otherwise the taxpayer could commence
doing business . . . [using a particular business form] and, if everything goes well,
realize the income tax advantages therefrom; but if things do not turn out so well,
may turn around and disclaim the business form he created . . . .”).
173. Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions of Law: Promoting
Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAW. 361, 379 (2005).
174. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
176. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 223 (1984) (“The true meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting as
complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its language, cannot be as-
certained if it be considered apart from related sections, or if the mind be isolated
from the history of the income tax legislation of which it is an integral part.”). The
Supreme Court concluded in King v. Burwell that facially unambiguous tax stat-
utes may be found to be ambiguous when considered in the context of the overall
structure of the statute. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–92 (2015).
177. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58
DUKE L.J. 1231, 1299 (2009).
178. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 168.
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implicating the larger cohesion or structural integrity of the text”
more than ninety percent of the time.179
4. Tax Logic
Tax scholars have identified certain policies and principles under-
lying the Code.180 While not spelled out in the statutes, they are
touchstones implicitly woven into the Code that “can be discovered . . .
through a thoughtful reading and study of the Code as a whole.”181
These tax policies and principles can be revealed through a process of
inductive reasoning whereby Code provisions are examined to identify
patterns from which to infer general policies and principles.182 Exam-
ples include the non-deductibility of personal consumption; the match-
ing of income and expenses; the realization requirement; the taxing of
an individual’s income only once; and the double taxation of corporate
income.183
One reasonable goal might be for a court to interpret tax statutes
in harmony with these permeating policies and principles.184 The as-
sumption underlying this kind of thinking is that Congress drafts the
Code with particular overarching policies and principles in mind. One
potential concern is that this approach may assume too much about
the cohesiveness of the Code.185 Even assuming Congress enacts tax
statutes in this manner, a second concern is whether all Code provi-
sions can be reduced to a set of underlying policies or principles.
B. Anatomy of Tax Legislative Process
The JCT is a congressional committee composed of ten members,
five from each of the two tax standing committees: the Senate Finance
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee.186 The JCT
179. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 177, at 1298. For insight into how drafters of tax
legislation make drafting choices that reinforce the Whole-Code canon, see Orei
& Osofosky, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
180. Professor Geier refers to this concept as “the theoretical construct that over-
arches the sum total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be
captured by it.” Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Pur-
pose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492, 497 (1995). Professor Weeks McCormack explains that,
“[g]eneral principles of tax law refer to overarching theoretical constructs
throughout the entire Code that are intended to be captured by its individual
provisions.” Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpreta-
tion: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 723 (2009).
181. Zelenak, supra note 91, at 639.
182. See Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, “Purposivism,” and the Interpretation
of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677, 689 (1996).
183. Geier, supra note 180, at 497; Weeks McCormack, supra note 180, at 723–24.
184. Livingston, supra note 182, at 689.
185. See supra notes 134–161 and accompanying text (discussing the Whole-Code ca-
non, a closely-related concept).
186. I.R.C. § 8001 (2012).
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has a professional staff of lawyers, economists, and accountants who
are non-partisan, meaning they do not operate as majority or minority
staff.187 Historically, the staff of the JCT  has had an influential role
in tax legislation. Career civil servants provide valuable institutional
knowledge and technical tax expertise.188 The JCT also provides
much-needed consistency to tax law by being involved in all phases of
the legislative process, including the drafting of statutory language,
committee reports, and post-enactment legislative materials com-
monly referred to as the “Blue Book.”189
Scholars have noted that the legislative process has become char-
acterized by unorthodox processes and procedures that have nega-
187. Overview, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, CONGRESS U.S., https://www.jct.gov/
about-us/overview.html [https://perma.unl.edu/QDR8-NB8L] (last visited Dec.
28, 2018).
It is not at all uncommon for the JCT Staff to be helping members of
Congress who are in the majority party in the House or Senate develop
and refine tax legislative proposals while it is simultaneously providing
technical and policy support to members in the minority party on differ-
ent and competing tax legislative proposals—proposals that are often in
direct conflict with those being advanced by the majority party.
Samuels, supra note 130, at 10.
188. Bernard M. “Bob” Shapiro, The Last 50 Years: The Evolving Role of the Joint Tax
Committee, 151 TAX NOTES 1125, 1130 (2016); Samuels, supra note 130, at 5
(“The average tenure of the professionals on the JCT Staff is 12 years.”). The staff
reports to the Chief of Staff, who is selected by the Chair of the JCT. Id. In the
JCT’s first fifty-five-year history, it had just four Chiefs, who served an average of
over thirteen years. Former Chiefs of Staff, JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N CONGRESS
U.S., https://www.jct.gov/about-us/history/former-chiefs-of-staff.html [https://per
ma.unl.edu/7KE8-NSQY]. Since then, there have been ten Chiefs who served an
average of less than four years. Id.
189. Livingston, supra note 78, at 834–35, 884; Shapiro, supra note 188, at 1130; Wal-
lace, supra note 77, at 196–203. In the past, the tax-writing committees met to
develop their conceptual proposals and once the concept has been hammered out
in sufficient detail, statutory language was drafted to reflect that conceptual un-
derstanding. Shapiro, supra note 188, at 1128. More recently, the chair of the
House Ways and Means Committee provides a “Chairman’s Mark,” draft legisla-
tion for the committee to consider. Id. The statutory text may be prepared by the
JCT or the Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC). Joint Committee on Taxation,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, CONGRESS U.S., https://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-
jct.html [https://perma.unl.edu/F2CG-FY3X]; Shapiro, supra note 188, at 1130
(explaining that OLC drafts with technical tax expertise from JCT). The OLC
essentially is a ghost writer for the congressional committees. Sandra Strokoff,
How Our Laws Are Made: A Ghost Writer’s View, OFF. LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Before_Drafting/Ghost_Wri
ter.html [https://perma.unl.edu/37FZ-N8UG]; see also Interpretation of Tax Stat-
utes, supra note 78, at 834–35. Use of the OLC is optional. See MATTHEW ERIC
GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20856, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL:
SENATE (2008) (“Drafting assistance is provided only upon request as there is no
requirement in the rules of the Senate that bills, resolutions, or amendments be
drafted by the office.”); MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20735, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL: HOUSE 2 (2008) (“Requests for draft-
ing assistance are at Members’ initiative.”).
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tively impacted legislation.190 In 2002, Professor Steve Johnson noted
that “[f]ederal tax legislation, including the precision of its drafting,
has been on a downwards trajectory.”191 Historically, “the tax stand-
ing committees (guided by the Joint Committee on Taxation) have
drafted on a bipartisan basis in close consultation with the Treasury
Department, with the goal of securing unanimity prior to introduc-
tion.”192 More recently, however, congressional committees’ legislative
drafting roles have diminished as more people have become involved
in the design of legislation, including the White House, party leader-
ship, and members of Congress who have hired their own tax staffs to
develop tax policy and push their own agendas.193 The bypassing of
committees and other subject-matter experts causes the quality of leg-
islation to suffer.194 Today, the Joint Committee and the Treasury
play a lesser role in the development of tax policy.195 Unorthodox
processes curb the deliberation of proposed legislation.196 Voting is
done on a partisan basis, and the use of the fast-track reconciliation
process to enact legislation is becoming increasingly popular.197
Consider the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 as an illustration of
legislative sausage making.198 The four-hundred page document
passed without any hearings just two weeks after the text was re-
leased.199 The quality of the language likely was impacted by last-
190. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS 4 (5th ed. 2017).
191. Steve R. Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Interpreted in Favor of
Taxpayers?, 10 NEV. LAW. 15, 16 n.14 (2002).
192. James. J. Brudney, Contextualizing Shadow Conversations, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 37, 42–43 (2017).
193. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 64, at 43 (noting a shift to “more amorphous control”
over drafting of tax legislation); Shapiro, supra note 188, at 1127–29.
194. SINCLAIR, supra note 190, at 264–67.
195. Shapiro, supra note 188, at 1130.
196. SINCLAIR, supra note 190. Sinclair notes that “less deliberation at the prefloor
stage of the process . . . would be a serious negative by-product of unorthodox
lawmaking, since this is when real deliberation takes place, if it takes place at
all.” Id. at 264.
197. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2121, 2124 (2013) (“Majority voting, reduced committee power, and a trun-
cated timeline—features of existing fast-track processes—engender fragile and
narrow tax legislation rather than complex, long-lasting tax reform.”). Unortho-
dox lawmaking is the “new textbook process.” Gluck et al., supra note 43, at 1794.
198. Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054; see also Oei &
Ososfky, supra note 64, at 4, 63–64 (summarizing various criticisms of the pro-
cess used to enact the 2017 Tax Act).
199. Mike Fox, Winners and Losers: Professors Critique New Tax Law’s Impact on
Taxpayers, Economy, U. VA. SCH. L. NEWS & MEDIA (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www
.law.virginia.edu/news/201801/winners-and-losers-professors-critique-new-tax-
laws-impact-taxpayers-economy [https://perma.unl.edu/TZW2-BUY6].
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minute changes to the text on the floor.200 Legislators voted in a parti-
san fashion—in the Senate the vote was in favor fifty-one to forty-
nine.201 Compare that result with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which
involved significant input from tax experts, and in particular the staff
of the JCT.202 The 1986 tax reform involved “more than a dozen hear-
ings in Congress, and the process took more than six months.”203
While unorthodox processes may help get legislation enacted in the
midst of gridlock,204 those processes are problematic to the extent ex-
perts are sidelined from drafting legislation or proposals are insuffi-
ciently vetted:
Nonexperts are less likely to draft with the rest of the landscape of relevant
law in mind, creating less consistent and coherent law than courts often pre-
sume or desire. Even unorthodox legislation drafted inside Congress may be
more textually messy, less thoroughly deliberated, and less likely to have been
reviewed and understood by all stakeholders. From the courts’ perch, these
deficiencies can make a judge’s job more difficult.205
To the extent the legislative process is degrading, there may be
more pressure on judges to deploy more purposivist approaches that
exploit the capacities of judges rather than textualist approaches that
exploit legislators’ capacities.
C. Role and Influence of the Tax Court
Tax Court judges are uniquely positioned to play an influential role
in the interpretation of tax statutes. They typically come to the bench
with prior tax experience as lawyers in private practice and within the
government as policy advisors to the Treasury or the legislative
200. Herb Jackson & Eliza Collins, Senate Passes Huge Tax Cuts After Last-Minute
Changes; Conference with House Next, USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/01/senate-passes-huge-tax-cuts-after-
last-minute-changes-conference-house-next/914701001/ [https://perma.unl.edu/R
F6L-EWNU].
201. Jasmine C. Lee & Sara Simon, How Every Senator Voted on the Tax Bill, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/polit
ics/tax-bill-senate-live-vote.html.
202. Tax Reform Act of 1896, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Sheldon D. Pollack,
Tax Reform: The 1980’s in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489, 518–25 (1991).
203. John Cassidy, The Passage of the Senate Republican Tax Bill Was a Travesty,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/sections/news/the-pas
sage-of-the-senate-republican-tax-bill-was-a-travesty [https://perma.unl.edu/25
5M-QTNU].
204. SINCLAIR, supra note 190, at 267 (“[P]artisan polarization has made it necessary
for the majority-party leaders to employ unorthodox processes and procedures at
the prefloor and postpassage stages in order to legislate successfully.”). Data that
Sinclair analyzed shows that the use of special processes and procedures that
characterize “unorthodox lawmaking” help bills get enacted into law. Id. at 261.
205. Gluck et al., supra note 43, at 1838–39. Gluck, along with O’Connell and Po, have
written about the role of courts in interpreting legislation given Congress’s unor-
thodox practices. Id. at 1850.
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branch.206 Their prior work experience likely gives the Tax Court an
institutional capacity to engage in a more purposive analysis of the
Code.207 Once on the bench, they hone that experience by handling a
tax-exclusive docket.208 Additionally, the Tax Court is a court with
national jurisdiction, meaning appeals of its decisions are heard in all
the federal circuit courts.209 This feature might embolden Tax Court
judges to act quite independently because, as discussed below, special-
ized trial court judges are less likely to defer to hierarchically superior
judges that are generalists.210 Also, pursuant to the Golsen rule, the
Tax Court does not feel bound to follow appellate court precedent it
thinks is wrongly decided.211 In fact, it may be that hierarchically su-
perior judges downwardly defer to their specialized colleagues.212
1. Specialist and Generalist Judges’ Differing Approaches to
Statutory Interpretation
Claims by the Internal Revenue Service that taxpayers owe addi-
tional taxes may be challenged in the federal district courts, the
United States Court of Federal Claims, and the United States Tax
Court. To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district courts or the
Court of Federal Claims, taxpayers have to first pay what the govern-
ment claims is owed and then pursue a refund.213 The Tax Court is
the only court with jurisdiction to hear tax disputes without taxpayers
having to pay prior to litigating.214
Unlike jurists in the Court of Federal Claims, federal district
courts, or circuit courts who handle an assortment of cases whose sub-
ject matter and applicable law vary widely, Tax Court judges are en-
grossed solely in the law of tax.215 It would be reasonable to expect
that Tax Court judges, given their specialization, would interpret the
meaning of statutory text differently than generalist judges.216 Pro-
206. See infra notes 287–288 and accompanying text; Schneider, supra note 41, at 339
and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 248–249 and accompanying text.
208. See infra notes 244–245, 287–288 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 233–235 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 236–242 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 272–286 and accompanying text.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 149 (United States Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1) (United States district courts’ jurisdiction). See supra note 74 and
accompanying text for challenges faced by generalist judges interpreting the
Code.
214. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
215. See infra notes 254–256 and accompanying text for discussion of Tax Court’s
jurisdiction.
216. Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 771, 774–75 (1997) (“[T]he plain meaning approach . . . depends upon a
judicial determination that the statutory provision being interpreted is not am-
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fessor Deborah Geier speculated that specialized judges might more
closely stick to the text whereas generalist judges may be “more quick
to let go of the literal language.”217 It could be that generalist judges
gravitate towards spongy legal standards, particularly if they are
more steeped in the common law, while specialized judges who are
more immersed in statutory law are drawn to precise legal rules.218 In
short, generalist judges might lean towards looser, more inexact inter-
pretations given their familiarity with more malleable common law
standards while specialized judges who are more familiar with precise
statutory rules would lean towards more exacting interpretations.
Generalist judges who “let go of the literal language” may simply be
capitalizing on their common-law training and experience.
But an equally likely explanation might be that judges who are
uneasy with the law at issue may be less likely to depart from the text
while those who are comfortable may be more likely to depart from the
literal text to try to infer congressional intent.219 It may be that gener-
alist judges who appreciate the limits of their expertise restrain them-
selves from blazing new paths into unknown thickets of legal terrain,
preferring instead to adhere as closely as possible to the legal text.220
Both of these theories seem plausible, and empirical data support
both. Professor Daniel Schneider’s empirical work seems to support
Geier’s supposition. Schneider compared a sample of Tax Court deci-
sions from 1979 through 1998 to a sample of federal tax opinions from
three federal district courts encompassing Los Angeles, Chicago, and
biguous. Whether the language of a statute is ambiguous or not may depend upon
the background and knowledge of the interpreter as well as the skill of the
drafter.”).
217. Geier, supra note 180, at 512 n.64.
218. David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 848
(1999) (“[I]t may be that formalism and expertise go hand-in-hand: that is, that a
rule system highly elaborated, and achieving precision by the use of technical
terms, is the type of regime with which the common law generalist-judge would
be least prepared to deal.”).
219. See CUMMINGS, supra note 111, at 81 (speculating that as the Supreme Court’s
docket of tax cases has declined over the years, the Court has become “less con-
versant” in tax law, which may contribute to its textualist trend in tax cases);
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 177, at 1297–98 (surmising that the Supreme
Court relies on tax-specific canons for “expertise borrowing” in light of the com-
plexity of tax law).
220. Professors James Brudney and Corey Ditslear found that the Supreme Court in-
voked legislative purpose less in tax cases than in workplace cases (eighty per-
cent of workplace cases versus fifty-two percent of tax cases). Brudney & Ditslear,
supra note 177, at 1253, tbl.1. They hypothesize that the Court may rely less on
legislative purposes in tax cases because the “Justices are not familiar or comfort-
able enough with the underlying tax policies to impute them to Congress.” Id. at
1255. This may also explain the Justices’ increased reliance on interpretive ca-
nons as a way to resolve disputes that require specialized knowledge that the
Justices lack. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory
Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 661 (1992).
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New York City to determine the effect of the Tax Court’s specializa-
tion on statutory interpretation.221 Schneider concluded that district
court judges used non-literal approaches more than the Tax Court:
Judges in the district court cases relied on practical reasoning even more than
judges in the Tax Court cases. Perhaps the greater breadth of the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction that district court judges face leads them to justify decisions
more pragmatically than judges on the Tax Court, with its narrower
jurisdiction.222
By contrast, Professor David Shores’s empirical study seems to
support the opposite premise: specialized judges are more likely than
generalists to depart from the literal statutory text.223 Shores identi-
fied all Tax Court decisions that were reversed on appeal between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2006.224 He then further limited
his sample to cases involving the interpretation of seemingly unam-
biguous statutory provisions whose plain meanings were inconsistent
with their underlying purposes.225 He found that for every case in the
sample, the Tax Court took an intentionalist approach while the ap-
pellate courts were more likely to adhere to the plain meaning of the
legislation.226 Shores’s work supports the theory that specialized
221. Schneider, supra note 41. Schneider’s sample population consisted of 482 cases—
346 Tax Court decisions and 136 district court decisions. The three federal dis-
trict courts whose opinions Schneider sampled were: (1) the Central District of
California whose jurisdiction includes Los Angeles; (2) the Northern District of
Illinois whose jurisdiction includes Chicago; and (3) the Southern District of New
York whose jurisdiction includes Manhattan. Schneider coded the courts’ ratio-
nale, including, among other things, strict construction, reliance on the structure
or purpose of the Code, reliance on legislative history, and the use of practical
reasoning, which involves an analysis of “statutory text, legislative history, and
evolutive considerations—including judicial and administrative precedents and
applicable current values—together with the consequences of alternate interpre-
tations and the court’s own policy sense.” Schneider, supra note 41, at 330 (quot-
ing Livingston, supra note 182).
222. Schneider, supra note 41, at 340.
223. The conflicting outcomes in Shores’s work and Schneider’s are impossible to rec-
oncile due to, among other things, differences in methodologies used to compile
their datasets.
224. David F. Shores, Textualism and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 TAX LAW.
53 (2007).
225. Shores excluded cases that interpreted ambiguous statutory provisions or that
applied tax anti-abuse doctrines. The initial step identified 251 Tax Court cases.
The second step reduced the sample size to ten, which is so small as to prevent
drawing highly confident conclusions. Id. at 61–62.
226. Id. at 62. Work by Jack Cummings confirms the continuation of this trend. Cum-
mings extended Shores’s work by examining Tax Court cases from 2007 to 2015.
Jasper L. Cummings Jr., Trending Literalism in the Tax Court, 153 TAX NOTES
1461 (2016). He found only three cases that matched Shores’s criteria (i.e., cases
where the Tax Court favored intentionalism where plain meaning would produce
an inappropriate result, but the Tax Court was reversed on appeal by textualist
appellate courts). In all three cases, the Tax Court applied intentionalist ap-
proaches and the appellate courts applied textualist approaches. Id.
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judges favor non-literal approaches to statutory interpretation over
generalized judges, particularly in cases where a literal interpretation
would lead to a windfall for the taxpayer. Specialized judges with rela-
tively more tax knowledge and expertise understandably may engage
more effortlessly with technical tax rules and underlying tax policy
than generalized judges.227 Under this theory, one might expect Tax
Court judges to be better equipped to apply a contextual analysis that
depends on the overall structure of the Code and its underlying pur-
poses.228 Such an approach allows specialized judges to distinguish
themselves from generalist judges and protect their turf by favoring
purposive approaches that reaffirm their tax expertise.229
In an earlier work, Shores reached the opposite conclusion, finding
that the Tax Court was more likely to take a textualist approach. This
article examined four Tax Court cases that made their way to the Su-
preme Court.230 In two of the cases, the Tax Court favored a textualist
interpretation that respected the form of each of the taxpayer’s trans-
actions, but the Supreme Court reversed using an intentionalist ap-
proach.231 The Tax Court adopted a non-literal reading in the other
two cases, but according to Shores, the Tax Court felt compelled to
disregard the literal text in those cases based on the Supreme Court’s
intentionalist approach in one of the earlier cases.232 His earlier arti-
cle also highlights cases where the Tax Court took an intentionalist
approach to fill gaps where the statute was silent.233 From this analy-
sis, Shores concludes:
When the Tax Court is [not bound by precedent], it will choose textualism over
intentionalism in instances where the statute, literally applied, provides a
clear answer to the question at hand. If the answer is not an appropriate one,
it is inclined to leave the solution to Congress. The appellate courts, however,
are inclined to favor intentionalism over textualism and disregard the plain
227. See STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 612 (8th ed. 2012) (stating that the “Tax Court was somewhat more
inclined to apply [tax anti-abuse] doctrines than the generalist judges of the
courts of appeals” in tax shelter litigation).
228. See Lynda J. Oswald, Improving Federal Circuit Doctrine Through Increased
Cross-Pollination, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 252 (2017) (stating that “specialized
courts may contribute to greater accuracy in legal doctrine,” with “accuracy” in
this context meaning a legal rule consistent “with the policy underlying the legal
regime and the needs and expectations” of frequent actors operating within that
regime).
229. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006) (describing how tax lawyers gained a com-
petitive advantage over accountants by supporting judicial anti-abuse doctrines,
which allowed lawyers to rely on their legal expertise).
230. See David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions: Taking Institu-
tional Choice Seriously, 55 TAX LAW. 667, 672 (2002).
231. See id. at 689–91, 703.
232. Id. at 703–04.
233. Shores, supra note 224, at 60 and accompanying text.
1154 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1118
language of the statute when necessary to achieve what they view as an ap-
propriate result.234
The pattern Shores identified in the Tax Court’s jurisprudence was
a preference for textualism over literalism when the statute literally
applied even if the result reached was inappropriate. But where the
statutory language was unclear, the Tax Court was more willing to
adopt an intentionalist approach. Resolving the apparent discrepancy
between Shores’s two studies is difficult because they made use of dif-
ferent methodologies. Additionally, the earlier work reached more
granular conclusions based on non-empirical analysis. In his more re-
cent work, Shores reconciled the two articles by saying “[b]oth suggest
that the Tax Court has moved toward greater emphasis on intention-
alism, even as the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have
moved in the opposite direction.”235
Gitlitz v. Commissioner is consistent with Shores’s more recent
study.236 The Supreme Court in Gitlitz applied a decidedly textualist
interpretation to determine how to treat the discharge of debt of an
insolvent S corporation. The S corporation realized cancellation of in-
debtedness income, but because it was insolvent, it did not recognize
any taxable income.237 Instead, section 108 required the corporation
to reduce certain tax attributes, including net operating losses.238 Al-
though the cancellation of indebtedness (COD) income resulted in no
taxable income, the shareholders nonetheless increased their stock ba-
sis by their pro rata share of the COD income, which gave them suffi-
cient basis to deduct their suspended losses, leaving no losses subject
to section 108 attribute reduction.239
In deciding for the government, the Tax Court and the Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized the tax windfall that would otherwise result to the tax-
payers. Under the taxpayers’ interpretation, they would not pay tax
on the COD income passed through to them and they were able to
234. Shores, supra note 230, at 703–04.
235. Shores, supra note 224, at 63; see also John F. Manning, Forward: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (2014) (noting the Supreme
“Court’s . . . fundamental shift . . . toward textualism in recent years”). In compar-
ing tax decisions in the Burger Court (1969–1986) and the Rehnquist/Roberts
Court (2005–2008), Professors Brudney and Ditslear found that the Court relies
more on text and language canons than in the past and less on legislative history
and purpose, although only the decline in the use of legislative history is statisti-
cally significant. These findings are consistent with the Court’s trend towards
textualism. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 177, at 1255–57.
236. Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
237. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108(a).
238. I.R.C. § 108(b)(2).
239. Section 108 treats shareholders’ losses from prior years that exceeded the share-
holders’ stock bases as an S corporation attribute available for reduction. I.R.C.
§ 108(d)(7)(B).
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deduct their suspended losses.240 Had the suspended losses been re-
duced pursuant to section 108 before the positive adjustment to stock
basis, there would have been no losses left for the shareholders to de-
duct.241 The Supreme Court did not address this “policy concern,” con-
cluding instead that a plain reading of the statutes at issue permitted
the result that the taxpayers obtained.242 It relied on the plain read-
ing of section 1366(a)(1), which provided for a basis increase for “items
of income (including tax-exempt income)”243 and section 108(b)(4)(A),
which provided that attribute reductions “shall be made after the de-
termination of tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year of the
discharge.”244 Congress overruled Gitlitz by prohibiting the pass-
through of S corporation COD income that is excluded from income
under section 108.245 This change prevents the double benefit permit-
ted in Gitlitz.
2. Tax Court’s Independence: Marching to Its Own Beat
The United States Tax Court’s status as a national court as well as
the judges’ tax expertise may result in their weak deference to hierar-
chically superior courts.
a. Tax Court Is a National Trial Court
The United States Tax Court is a trial court of national jurisdiction
that decides cases filed by taxpayers throughout the country.246 Un-
like appeals from any one of the ninety-four federal district courts or
the United States Court of Claims that are considered by a single ap-
pellate court, Tax Court decisions are appealable to one of the twelve
regional U.S. Courts of Appeal, depending on the taxpayer’s residence
or principal place of business at the time the petition was filed in the
Tax Court.247
240. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 208–10.
241. Id. at 217.
242. Id. at 219–20.
243. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1).
244. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 208–09.
245. I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A), enacted by Pub. L. 107-147, sec. 402(a) (2002).
246. I.R.C. § 7445.
247. See I.R.C § 7482(b)(1) (explaining that cases of individual taxpayers are appeala-
ble to the circuit court in the district where the taxpayer resided at the time the
petition was filed in the Tax Court, corporate taxpayers appeal their Tax Court
cases to the district where their principal place of business or principal office was
located, and partnerships appeal to the district where their principal place of bus-
iness was located). By comparison, federal courts of appeals hear challenges to
trial court decisions from district courts located within their circuit. Court Role
and Structure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-
role-and-structure [https://perma.unl.edu/LKE6-HK8E]. Appeals from the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims are heard by the Federal Circuit. Id.
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The Tax Court, despite being a trial court, may feel less con-
strained by the courts of appeal as compared to federal district courts
and the Court of Federal Claims due to the unique inverted pyramid
structure characterizing appeals from the Tax Court to all of the fed-
eral circuit courts.248 Such a structure may embolden the Tax Court to
press its own views and create its own precedent.
The Tax Court in Golsen v. Commissioner held that it will follow
squarely on point judicial precedent from the appeals court to which
appeal would lie.249 This approach fosters judicial efficiency by de-
creasing the probability of reversal by the appellate court. But the Tax
Court only rarely invokes Golsen.250 Rather, the Tax Court reads the
rule narrowly to apply only where the “clearly established position of
the Court of Appeals” signals “inevitable” reversal upon appeal.251
The Tax Court more typically refuses to apply Golsen by distinguish-
ing the facts or the law. For example, in Tiger’s Eye Trading, LLC v.
Commissioner, the Tax Court did not follow precedent in the D.C. Cir-
cuit that held that a partner’s basis in her partnership interest cannot
be determined in a partnership-level proceeding because it is not a
partnership item. The Tax Court declined to follow the hierarchically
superior court’s precedent because the D.C. Circuit did not consider
various Treasury regulations that the Tax Court believed to be rele-
vant.252 As the Tax Court noted in Lardas v. Commissioner:
It should be emphasized that the logic behind the Golsen doctrine is not that
we lack the authority to render a decision inconsistent with any Court of Ap-
peals (including the one to which an appeal would lie), but that it would be
futile and wasteful to do so where we would surely be reversed.253
As a national court, the Tax Court feels obliged to ensure the uni-
form interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code for similarly situ-
ated taxpayers.254 Thus, despite Golsen, the fact that the Tax Court is
248. See Shores, supra note 230 at 703–04.
249. Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
250. See K. Martin Worthy, The Tax Litigation Structure, 5 GA. L. REV. 248, 253
(1971) (“[T]he Tax Court has rarely encountered a circuit court decision directly
contrary to the position the Tax Court believes correct.”).
251. Lardas v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 490, 495 (1992).
252. Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 67 (2012). The Tax Court’s decision
to permit the Tax Court to determine the partner’s basis in his partnership inter-
est in the partnership-level proceeding was reversed on appeal to the D.C. Circuit
due to an intervening decision from the U.S. Supreme Court while the case was
pending. United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 42 (2013) (“To be sure, the District
Court could not make a formal adjustment of any partner’s outside basis in this
partnership-level proceeding.”).
253. Lardas, 99 T.C. at 495.
254. Lawrence v. Comm’r, 27 T.C. 713, 719 (1957) (“The Tax Court, being a tribunal
with national jurisdiction over litigation involving the interpretation of Federal
taxing statutes which may come to it from all parts of the country, has a[n] . . .
obligation to apply with uniformity its interpretation of those statutes.”). Part of
the Tax Court’s mission is to ensure “the uniform interpretation of the Internal
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a trial court does not seem to hamper its independence to the extent it
does not feel bound to follow appellate court precedent it thinks is
wrongly decided.255
b. Effect of Tax Court’s Expertise on Its Independence
The Tax Court is composed of nineteen judges who are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate for renewable fifteen-
year terms.256 Deficiency determinations—which permit taxpayers to
challenge amounts that the government claims are owed without pay-
ing first—comprise a predominant piece of the Tax Court’s docket.257
Other grants of jurisdiction are scattered throughout the Code, includ-
ing review of collection due process cases under sections 6320 and
6330, innocent spouse claims under section 6015, and determinations
regarding whistleblower awards under section 7423.258 An exhaustive
list of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is unnecessary; the point is that,
unlike federal district courts and the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax
Court’s exclusive domain revolves around the Internal Revenue Code.
In addition, the Tax Court handles the vast majority of tax cases. The
IRS Chief Counsel’s Office, which represents the IRS in Tax Court,
reported that it closed 29,802 Tax Court cases for fiscal year 2017.259
By comparison, just 253 refund cases were closed in the other two
fora.260 Because the Tax Court’s sole jurisdiction is with respect to
taxes, Tax Court judges must stay abreast of tax issues and as a by-
product, they certainly develop tax expertise on the bench.261 In addi-
tion to the expertise that results from deciding disputes between
taxpayers and the IRS, Tax Court judges typically come to the bench
with prior tax experience.262
Revenue Code.” About the U.S. Tax Court, TAXCOURT.GOV, https://www.ustax
court.gov/about.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/NY5Y-UXFB].
255. Consider Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42 (1981). The Tax Court re-
fused to follow Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979), by distin-
guishing it on its facts. Id. at 72–74. The Tax Court also took the opportunity to
explain why it disagreed with the appellate court’s reasoning: “The Rickey opin-
ion has, in effect, added a new provision to the Internal Revenue Code” by permit-
ting the waiver of attribution rule in section 302(c)(2)(A) to apply to waive
beneficiary-to-trust attribution under section 318(a)(3) despite the fact that the
waiver rule expressly says it applies to waive family attribution under 318(a)(1).
Id. at 71.
256. I.R.C. §§ 7443(a), (b), (e).
257. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
258. See I.R.M. 35.1.1.2 (Aug. 11, 2004) for additional grants of jurisdiction.
259. IRS, IRS DATA BOOK 62, tbl.27 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8VR-TJJY].
260. Id.
261. According to data on file with the author, the average time on the bench is over
twelve years.
262. See infra notes 287–288 and accompanying text. “District court judges were more
likely to be drawn from private practice, academia, and the judiciary, while more
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Much has been written about the fact that specialized judges, like
those on the Tax Court, are less prone to defer to generalist judges,
like those on the federal circuit courts that hear appeals from the Tax
Court.263 Whether intentional or the result of unconscious bias, spe-
cialists are less responsive to hierarchically superior courts because
they see them as less knowledgeable. By contrast, generalist lower
court judges are more responsive to hierarchically superior courts who
are also generalists.264
A recent line of cases involving tax-preferred entities and Roth
IRAs provides a good example of this phenomenon.265 The seminal
case, Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, involved a parent corpo-
ration of a group of manufacturing companies.266 In 2008, the parent
corporation, Summa Holdings, Inc. (Summa), made a series of pay-
ments to JC Export, Inc. (JC Export), a corporation that elected under
Code section 992 to be treated as a domestic international sales corpo-
ration (DISC). JC Export, in turn, distributed those payments to its
sole shareholder, JC Holding Export Holding, Inc. (JC Holding) who
made distributions to its sole shareholders, two Roth IRAs. In form,
Summa would receive a deduction for commissions paid to JC Export,
Tax Court judges had previous experience working for the government.” Schnei-
der, supra note 41, at 338.
263. See Robert M. Howard & Shenita Brazelton, Specialization in Judicial Decision
Making: Comparing Bankruptcy Panels and Federal District Court Judges, 22
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407, 416 (2014) (noting that specialized courts are less
deferential to “hierarchically superior courts” as compared to generalized courts);
HOWARD, supra note 130, at 70 (summarizing results of empirical study indicat-
ing that “[t]he District Court, but not the Tax Court, is strongly influenced by the
appropriate Federal Court of Appeals”); Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of
Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 1678 (2009) (speculating that special-
ized judges may “tend to accord less authority to their superiors than do general-
ists because they see generalist superiors as less knowledgeable than
themselves”); Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Su-
preme Court and Lower Federal Courts, POL. RESEARCH Q., Sept. 1994, at 693
(reporting the results of an empirical study that compared the degree of authority
that the Supreme Court had over the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), a specialized court, and the federal circuit courts, whose judges are gen-
eralists, by measured Supreme Court citations, and finding that the circuit courts
more frequently cited the Supreme Court as compared to the CCPA).
264. HOWARD, supra note 130, at 55 (“Songer, Cameron, and Segal (1995) show that
federal appellate courts responded to conservative decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court with increased conservative decisions, even controlling for appellate ideol-
ogy.”); Shores, supra note 224, at 79 (explaining that federal district courts “are
likely to follow the courts of appeal in their approach to statutory construction”).
265. The Tax Court has also applied substance-over-form principles to impose liability
in an earlier line of cases where taxpayers used non-tax preferred entities such as
C corporations and LLCs to transfer value to their Roth IRAs. See, e.g., Block
Developers, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2017-142 (T.C. 2017); Polowniak v. Comm’r,
T.C.M. 2016-31 (T.C. 2016); Repetto v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2012-168 (T.C. 2012).
266. T.C.M. 2015-119 (T.C. 2015).
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thus reducing its taxable income.267 As a DISC, JC Export would not
have paid tax on the commissions it received, but JC Holding would
have paid tax on the dividend income received from JC Export.268 Fi-
nally, JC Holdings’ distributions to the Roth IRAs would not be sub-
ject to the contribution limits imposed on Roth IRAs, and those
amounts as well as any accumulation, could be distributed tax-free to
the Roth IRA owners.269 If these transactions were respected, the
Roth IRA owners would essentially have funded their IRAs with in-
come from their operating business while avoiding the Roth IRA con-
tribution limits.
The Tax Court granted the government’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, holding that the commission payments made to JC
Export and then distributed to JC Holding and the Roth IRAs were
actually distributions from Summa to its shareholders followed by
contributions to the Roth IRAs. As recharacterized, Summa would be
liable for additional tax for the disallowed deduction, Summa share-
holders would be taxed on the distributions, and the IRA owners
would be liable for excise taxes pursuant to section 4973(a) for making
contributions that exceeded the contribution limits. The Tax Court re-
lied on the substance over form doctrine to recharacterize the transac-
tions based on the taxpayers’ admission that they had no “nontax
business purpose or economic purpose for [entering into] the transac-
tions.”270 The taxpayers “sole reason for entering into the transactions
at issue was to transfer money into the . . . Roth IRAs so that income
could accumulate on the assets . . . and then be distributed tax
free.”271 The Tax Court expressed that “[t]he substance over form doc-
trine applies when the transaction on its face lies outside the plain
intent of the statute and respecting the transaction would be to exalt
artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in ques-
tion of all serious purpose.”272
The issue on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was Summa’s tax liability.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, taking issue with the lower
court’s broad application of the substance over form doctrine. The
Sixth Circuit would apply the substance over form doctrine only to
267. Id.
268. I.R.C. § 991 (DISC not subject to income tax); § 301 (dividend income is taxable).
The dividends JC Holding received would bear income tax at the corporation’s
full tax rate because no dividends-received deduction is available for dividends
paid by a DISC. I.R.C. § 246(d).
269. Summa, T.C.M. 2015-119 (“Dividends paid on stock held by a Roth IRA are con-
sidered earnings of the Roth IRA itself, rather than contributions by the owner of
the Roth IRA, and do not count towards the contribution limits of section 408A.”).
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 3.
272. Id. at 6.
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transactions lacking economic substance.273 A broader doctrine that
would allow the government to ignore a transaction with economic
substance that complies with a literal reading of the Code in favor of
its substance is, according to the Sixth Circuit, “hard to square with
the Supreme Court’s textually respectful methods of statutory inter-
pretation.”274 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “[s]tatutory pur-
pose no doubt has a role to play,” but that purpose must be “grounded
in text.”275 The government argued that the Code’s overarching pur-
pose was to raise revenue, but the court said the “text-driven function”
of the DISC and IRA provisions is to minimize revenue.276 In short,
the purpose of these provisions was to reduce tax and that is what the
taxpayers did. That the taxpayers were able to “structure their trans-
actions in unanticipated tax-reducing ways,” does not give the Com-
missioner the power to ignore the text of the Code.277 In the Sixth
Circuit’s view, “[t]he best way to effectuate Congress’s nuanced policy
judgments is to apply each provision as its text requires.”278
After the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Summa Holdings, the Tax
Court had an opportunity to revisit its analysis in a similar case, Maz-
zei v. Commissioner.279 The taxpayers in Mazzei funded their Roth
IRAs with commissions paid by an operating company to a foreign
sales corporation (FSC) that were then distributed to the Roth IRAs.
After recharacterizing the form of the transactions using the sub-
stance over form doctrine (such that the taxpayers were deemed to
have received distributions from the operating company that they con-
tributed to their Roth IRAs) the government determined that the tax-
payers were liable for excise taxes for excess contributions made to
their Roth IRAs. The Tax Court, in a twelve to four decision, disre-
garded the form of a transaction in favor of its substance:
We conclude on the basis of the facts in the record that petitioners, and not
their Roth IRAs, were the substantive owners of the FSC stock at all relevant
times. Consequently, we conclude that in substance the payments from the
FSC were income to petitioners rather than to their Roth IRAs and then ex-
cess contributions by petitioners to their Roth IRAs.280
In disregarding the Roth IRAs’ ownership of the FSC stock, the Tax
Court applied the assignment of income doctrine, concluding that the
Roth IRAs lacked the benefits and burdens of ownership of that stock.
273. Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 787 (6th Cir. 2017).
274. Id. at 787.
275. Id. at 789.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 790 (“[T]he substance-over-form doctrine does not give the Commissioner a
warrant to search through the Internal Revenue Code and correct whatever over-
sights Congress happens to make or redo any policy missteps the legislature hap-
pens to take.”).
278. Id. at 788–89.
279. 150 T.C. No. 7, 2018 WL 1168766 (Mar. 5, 2018).
280. Id. at *8.
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The dissenting judges in Mazzei disagreed with the majority’s ap-
proach, which recharacterized transactions that complied with the lit-
eral text of the relevant Code provisions, noting that such an approach
is “inconsistent with the great textualist counterrevolution of the last
few decades.”281 The Supreme Court’s trend towards textualism seem-
ingly has had little impact on the Tax Court’s interpretive approach.
Notably, the tax Court in Mazzei applied a more narrowly-tailored
substance over form analysis than it did in Summa Holdings. Also,
the Tax Court in Mazzei noted that it was not bound to follow the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Summa Holdings because an appeal of Maz-
zei would go to the Ninth Circuit.
At the time Mazzei was decided, appeals by the Roth IRA owners
in the Tax Court’s Summa Holdings decision were pending. Since
then, the First Circuit, in a split two-to-one decision, held in favor of
the Roth IRA owners, concluding that the substance over form doc-
trine could not be used to recharacterize the transactions at issue.282
According to the First Circuit, the substance over form doctrine ap-
plies only when a “transaction upon its face lies outside the plain in-
tent of the statute.”283 According to the court, the taxpayers used a
DISC and Roth IRAs consistent with their congressionally-sanctioned
tax saving purposes.284 It will be interesting to see whether the Tax
Court continues to maintain its stance given two circuit court
reversals.
281. Id. at *34. Judge Holmes, who penned the dissent, sees Mazzei and Summa Hold-
ings as factually similar in that both taxpayers used tax-preferred entities—an
FSC in Mazzei and a DISC in Summa Holdings. Judge Holmes would argue that
substance-over-form principles are inapplicable in those cases because Congress
created FSCs and DISCs for tax-avoidance purposes. Cf. Block Developers, LLC
v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2017-142 (T.C. 2017) (involving the use of an LLC to transfer
value to a Roth IRA) In applying substance-over-form principles in ruling in favor
of the government, Judge Holmes noted that substance-over-form principles were
appropriate “where taxpayers used a corporate form that lacked any substance to
facilitate a tax-avoidance scheme.” Id. at *11 (citing Summa Holdings, 848 F.3d
at 785–86).
282. Benenson v. Comm’r, 887 F.3d 511, 513 (1st Cir. 2018). The parents’ appeal was
heard by the Second Circuit on April 10, 2018, but a decision has yet to be issued.
Benenson v. Comm’r, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1612 (T.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No.
16-2953 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2016).
283. Benenson, 887 F.3d at 517 (quoting Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470
(1935)).
284. Id. at 521.
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3. Informal Influence and Downward Deference285
Appellate courts review Tax Court findings of fact under a clearly
erroneous standard.286 The scope of appellate review with respect to
questions of law, at least theoretically, is less clear, however.287 The
Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner limited the scope of appel-
late review of Tax Court decisions to “clear-cut mistake[s] of law.”288
In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the predecessor of section
7482(c), which permitted reversal if the decision of the Tax Court was
“not in accordance with law.”289 The Court read this provision to mean
that Congress intended to limit appellate courts’ review of Tax Court
decisions.290
In response to Dobson, Congress enacted the predecessor of Code
section 7482(a), which provides for appellate review of Tax Court deci-
sions “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the
district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”291 But Congress
left intact section 7482(c). Some commentators maintain that Con-
gress’s amendments post-Dobson were directed at limiting appellate
review of the Tax Court as to questions of fact, but because section
7482(c) remained unaltered, Tax Court decisions relating to questions
of law were entitled to deference.292
While the enactment of section 7482(a) introduced theoretical un-
certainty, in practice appellate courts tend to review Tax Court deci-
285. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
851, 891 (2014) (using the phrase “downward deference” to refer to the Supreme
Court’s deference to lower-court precedent).
286. Section 7482(a) provides for appellate review of Tax Court decisions “in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions
tried without a jury.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) provides: “Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
287. See Vukasovich Inc. v. Comm’r, 790 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A]mbiguity
in this circuit’s case law has obscured the scope of review of Tax Court decisions
on questions of law.”).
288. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943).
289. Id. at 492.
290. Id. at 494.
291. I.R.C. § 7492(a).
292. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why
Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L.
REV. 235, 251 (1998); David F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions:
Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629 (1996) (explaining enactment of section 7482
and concluding that 7482(c) permits courts to defer to the Tax Court on issues of
law); see also Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of the United States Tax Court:
The Chevron Doctrine, 37 VA. TAX REV. 75 (2017) (arguing that Tax Court deci-
sions are entitled to Chevron deference because the Tax Court is an Article I
court within the executive branch).
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sions involving questions of law under a de novo standard.293
Hierarchically superior courts, however, have been known to defer to
the Tax Court due to the Tax Court’s subject-matter expertise or to
further the uniformity of the tax law.294 Supreme Court justices have
also argued that deference be given to the Tax Court. For example,
Justice Jackson, who was a tax lawyer before joining the United
States Supreme Court, noted in a dissent that the field of tax law is
“beset with invisible boomerangs.”295 He urged the Court to defer to
the Tax Court, “a more competent and steady influence toward a sys-
tematic body of tax law than our sporadic omnipotence.”296 Justice
Stevens, in his dissent in United Dominion Industries, Inc., urged the
Court to defer to the government in cases interpreting ambiguous tax
statutes if the taxpayer’s interpretation raises a potential for tax
abuse.297 Justice Stevens was not convinced of his ability to determine
whether statutory anti-abuse rules alleviated the government’s con-
cerns, noting that when dealing ‘“with a subject that is highly special-
ized and so complex as to be the despair of judges,’ an ounce of
deference is appropriate.”298
At least one empirical study found that the Tax Court was affirmed
more often than the District Courts and Claims Court (about seventy-
three percent vs. sixty percent) and the Tax Court was reversed less
often (about nineteen percent vs. thirty percent).299 The fact that the
293. Shores, supra note 292, at 667. Of course, “boilerplate language in appellate court
opinions as to the standard of review may not describe the true behavior of those
courts.” Johnson, supra note 292, at 252.
294. See, e.g., Esgar Corp. v. Comm’r, 744 F.3d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Rulings by
the Tax Court on matters of tax law are . . . persuasive authority, especially if
consistently followed.”); Meruelo v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although we
do not give the Tax Court special deference in a de novo review, ‘[b]ecause the
Tax Court has special expertise in the field, . . . its opinions bearing on the Inter-
nal Revenue Code are entitled to respect.’”)); Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r, 177
F.3d 1096, 1098 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pahl v. Comm’r, 150 F.3d 1124, 1127
(9th Cir.1998) (“The Tax Court’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code is
‘entitled to respect because of its special expertise in the field.’”)); see also Shores,
supra note 292, at 657–60 (discussing appellate cases that give the Tax Court
deference in practice while professing a de novo standard of review).
295. Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Kirk J.
Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV.
171, 173 (2001) for a discussion of Justice Jackson’s tax background.
296. Arrowsmith, 344 U.S. at 12.
297. United Dominion Ind., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 842 (2001) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
298. Id. (quoting Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943)).
299. Sean Bryant et al., An Empirical Study of Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal In-
come Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV. 125, 140 tbl. 2 (1989) (covering five-year period
from 1983 to 1987); see also Worthy, supra note 250, at 253 (finding that during
fiscal years 1967–1970, the Tax Court was fully reversed 13% of the time com-
pared to 23% for federal district court tax cases). These conclusions are consistent
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circuit courts agreed with the Tax Court more often than the genera-
lized trial courts that handle tax cases may indicate a kind of exper-
tise borrowing by the generalized circuit courts.300 It may also confirm
the Tax Court’s accuracy in reaching correct outcomes more often.
4. Duty to the Tax System
The overwhelming majority of regular Tax Court judges (eighty-
seven percent) currently on the bench have had private practice expe-
rience.301 They also had either prior IRS experience or tax-related
government experience exclusive of the IRS, including with the De-
partment of Justice Tax Division, the Joint Committee on Taxation,
the Senate Finance or House Ways and Means Committee staff, or as
a staff person to a member of Congress.302 It stands to reason that
pre-court experiences of Tax Court judges might influence their judi-
cial philosophy and approach to statutory interpretation in ways that
differ from generalist judges deciding tax cases.303
In particular, Tax Court judges’ prior experience as lawyers, both
in private practice and within the government, likely instilled in them
a taxpaying ethos, which the federal government began to cultivate
with data on file with the author for fiscal years 2002–2016, which shows the Tax
Court is reversed much less frequently than the generalized courts hearing re-
fund claims.
300. Bryant et al., supra note 299, at 132 (“Deference and lack of expertise lead the
circuits to affirm the Tax Court in a large number of cases.”).
301. Data as of June 1, 2018 on file with the author. The Tax Court is authorized to
have 19 judges. See supra note 243. There were four vacancies as of June 1, 2018.
Another vacancy was created when Judge Vasquez retired and assumed senior
status on June 24, 2018. Judges, U.S. TAX COURT (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.us
taxcourt.gov/judges.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/A6CW-FQJ7].
302. See supra note 301. The percentage of Tax Court judges with prior government
experience exclusive of the IRS has been trending up, while the percentage with
prior IRS experience has been declining. Id. Professor Robert Howard in a study
published in 2009 found that just 53% of regular judges had government experi-
ence exclusive of the IRS. HOWARD, supra note 130, at 58, tbl.4.1. That percent-
age is now 87%. He also found that 33% of all regular Tax Court judges had prior
IRS experience compared to 60% of senior judges, which are retired judges who
are recalled by the chief judge to serve. I.R.C. § 7447(c). Now, just 27% of regular
judges and 55% of senior judges have prior IRS experience.
303. See Schneider, supra note 41, at 331 (quoting from James J. Brudney et al., Judi-
cial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Science Background
Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999)) (“[P]re-court life
experiences play a prominent role in shaping the personal values and policy pref-
erences of judges, and . . . such biographical factors can be useful in predicting
judicial decisions.”). Prior employment was also a significant variable in another
study. Id. at 332 (quoting Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377 (1998)).
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during World War II.304 Today, this taxpaying ethos is reflected in the
tax bar’s “duty to the tax system,” which in broad strokes refers to the
tax bar’s ethical responsibility to “create, nurture, and promote a fair
tax system.”305 When advising clients, the duty to the system obli-
gates tax lawyers to take an “evenhanded approach to interpreting the
law.”306 Some would go so far as to say that the duty to the tax system
is satisfied only if doubts as to “questionable tax characterizations”
are resolved against the client and in favor of the government.307
There are several justifications for this duty, chief among them the
self-assessment nature of our tax system coupled with low levels of
government enforcement.308 Tax advisors have been characterized as
gatekeepers, allowing into the tax system “good” transactions that are
sustainable under the law while keeping out of the system “bad”
transactions.309 Due to the government’s limited resources, the tax
304. Richard Lavoie, Patriotism and Taxation: The Tax Compliance Implications of
the Tea Party Movement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 50–51 (2011). Using popular
media of the day, including movies, television, and radio, the government
helped create the perception among the general public that everyone had
a part to play in the war effort—a social contract basis for compliance—
and the awareness that the tax revenues were providing the men on the
front lines with guns, ammunition, planes, and other necessities—a quid
pro quo basis for compliance.
Fahey, supra note 87, at 182–83.
305. Richard Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper? A Tax Law Perspective on the Chal-
lenge of Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations and Zealous Advocacy in the Legal
Profession, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 813, 816 (2013). To be clear, as David Molden-
hauer observes: “The basis and scope of this duty to the system are not clear;
beyond basic principles, the views regarding the fundamental sources of a law-
yer’s duties to the tax system are all over the map.” David T. Moldenhauer, Circu-
lar 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on
the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 874
(2006). Commentators have called for these duties to the system, whatever they
are, to be made explicit. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in
Tax Adviser Professionalism in American Society, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2725
(2016) (“This Article advocates for the position that tax professionals owe a duty
to the tax system and such a duty must be grounded in concrete guidance.”); see
Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945–1965: Patriotism, Duties,
and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 17 (2012).
306. See Lavoie, supra note 305, at 816.
307. Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zeal-
ous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407, 420
(2008).
308. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 191 (1976) (“Our income tax system is pri-
marily a self-reporting and self-assessment one.”).
309. See Infanti, supra note 307, at 415 (noting that the tax bar “may often be the
ultimate arbiter of what the revenue laws require”). The gatekeeping role of tax
professionals may also be justified by the complexity of the tax laws, which ap-
parently is a feature of the Code, not a bug. See supra notes 68–71 and accompa-
nying text.
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bar often may be “de facto administrators of the tax system.”310 Tax
Court judges who have internalized a duty to the tax system might
assume a responsibility for the integrity of the tax system uniquely
different than their generalist colleagues.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the predominant statutory interpre-
tive approaches are deficient because they fail to consider the actual
processes by which laws were enacted. One way to address these defi-
ciencies is to customize interpretive doctrine to account for the actual
lawmaking process. This Article argues for a custom-tailored interpre-
tive doctrine specifically for the Internal Revenue Code. Tax is well-
suited to a bespoke statutory interpretive approach given several fac-
tors that were explored in this Article. Courts interpreting federal tax
laws should explicitly and consistently take account of these unique
characteristics.
310. David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—The
Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the
System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 197 (2009).
